Legality and Commitment

Abstract

Many philosophers believe there is no general, content-independent duty to obey the law. Yet at least some (and perhaps many) citizens and officials believe law makes a real difference—independently of its content and of prudential considerations—regarding what they should do. This paper offers an argument that vindicates the latter belief, even if skeptics are right in thinking that law cannot generate a general duty to obey. Under this argument, whether law makes a real practical difference, independently of its content and of the sanctions threatened for its violation, can turn on whether individuals have adopted a commitment to law. The paper provides an account of such commitments and their impact on reasons for action. As I argue, the fact that a legal system complies with the demands of the rule of law is one important reason why individuals ought to, or at least might, adopt such a commitment. Compliance with the rule of law is thus not normatively irrelevant, even if it does not directly ground a moral duty to obey.