Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> USC School of Philosophy en-US Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1559-3061 The Rent Tax Is Too Damn Low <p>Economists and philosophers discuss taxation in the context of the prevailing tax base. This prevailing tax base primarily consists of levies on earned income, capital, and consumption. In the optimal tax literature, economists find that this tax base possesses a problematic tradeoff between equity and efficiency. This tax base is also controversial amongst moral philosophers because it diminishes the principle of labor ownership. I explore a tax base that does not possess these two drawbacks and hence sidesteps problems with the current tax base raised both by optimal tax theorists and moral philosophers. Even partial replacement of the current tax base with the proposed tax base would increase efficiency, improve equity, and preserve labor ownership.</p> Matthew Jeffers Copyright (c) 2022 Matthew Jeffers 2022-11-28 2022-11-28 23 2 10.26556/jesp.v23i2.1797 Gender as Name <p>Many people believe that if you identify as a particular gender, then you are that gender. This paper is my attempt at making sense of this claim. I propose to conceive of genders as names: determined by the individual and not requiring any specific biological or psychological qualities, yet still important to the bearer.</p> Graham Bex-Priestley Copyright (c) 2022 Graham Bex-Priestley 2022-11-28 2022-11-28 23 2 10.26556/jesp.v23i2.1534 Moral Vagueness and Epistemicism <p>Epistemicism is one of the main approaches to the phenomenon of vagueness. But how does it fare in its treatment of<em> moral</em> vagueness? This paper has two goals. First, I shall explain why various recent arguments against an epistemicist approach to moral vagueness are unsuccessful. Second, I shall explain how, in my view, reflection on the Sorites can inform normative ethics in powerful and interesting ways. In this connection, I shall be putting the epistemicist treatment to work, engaging with a family of somewhat neglected issues concerning continuity that lie at the interface of metaphysics and ethics.</p> John Hawthorne Copyright (c) 2022 John Hawthorne 2022-11-28 2022-11-28 23 2 10.26556/jesp.v23i2.1602 Forgiving the Mote in Your Sister’s Eye <p>Many philosophers analyzing standing to blame have argued that a hypocrite can lack standing to blame someone even if what that person did is blameworthy, and that standingless, hypocritical blame is <em>pro tanto</em> morally wrongful. Philosophers have yet to address the issue of standing to forgive. In this article, I defend two main claims. I argue first that <em>if</em> these two claims about blame are true, <em>then</em> so are the two corresponding claims about forgiveness: a hypocritical forgiver can lack standing to forgive someone for an act even if there are reasons to hold that this act is forgivable, and standingless, hypocritical forgiveness is <em>pro tanto</em> morally wrongful. I then argue, separately, that these two claims about forgiveness <em>are</em> true.</p> Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen Copyright (c) 2022 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen 2022-11-28 2022-11-28 23 2 10.26556/jesp.v23i2.1957 Moral Disagreement and Practical Direction <div><span lang="EN-US">Whenever <em>A judges that x</em></span><em><span lang="EN-US">-ing is morally wrong&nbsp;</span></em><span lang="EN-US">and <em>B judges that x</em></span><em><span lang="EN-US">-ing is not morally wrong</span></em><span lang="EN-US">, we think that they disagree. The two standard types of accounts of such moral disagreements both presuppose that the class of moral wrong-judgments is uniform, though in different ways. According to <em>the belief account</em>, the disagreement is doxastic: A and B have beliefs with conflicting cognitive contents. This presupposes “belief-uniformity”: that the content of moral concepts is invariant in such a way that, whenever A believes that x</span><span lang="EN-US">-ing is morally wrong and B believes that x</span><span lang="EN-US">-ing is not morally wrong, their beliefs have mutually inconsistent contents. According to <em>the attitude account</em>, moral disagreements are non-doxastic: A and B have clashing practical attitudes. This presupposes “attitude-uniformity”: that moral judgments are always accompanied by, or consist of, desire-like attitudes. Consequently, neither account is available if both uniformity-claims are rejected – as e.g., various forms of content-relativism do. This paper presents a new non-doxastic account of deontic moral disagreement, consistent with the rejection of both uniformity-claims. I argue first, that even if deontic moral judgments are not desires, and are not always accompanied by desires, they have <em>practical direction </em>in the same sense as desires: they are attitudes that one can act in accordance or discordance with. Second: deontic moral disagreement can be understood as clashes in practical direction: roughly, A and B morally disagree if, and only if, some way of acting is in accordance with A’s judgment but in discordance with B’s. </span></div> Ragnar Francén Copyright (c) 2022 Ragnar Francén 2022-11-28 2022-11-28 23 2 10.26556/jesp.v23i2.1740 The Best Available Parent and Duties of Justice <p>I argue that the best available parent view, in its present formulation, struggles to accommodate for our very weighty duty not to perpetuate historical injustices. I offer an alternative view that reconciles this tension. </p> Jordan Walters Copyright (c) 2022 Jordan Walters 2022-11-28 2022-11-28 23 2 10.26556/jesp.v23i2.2113 The Stability of the Just Society <div class="page" title="Page 1"> <div class="layoutArea"> <div class="column"> <p>Political theorists have invested significant effort in studying the attributes of desirable social-moral states of affairs. Schaefer (forthcoming) aims to show that “static political theory” of this kind rests on shaky foundations. His argument revolves around an application of an abstruse mathematical theorem — Kakutani’s fixed point theorem — to the social-moral domain. We show that Schaefer has misunderstood the implications of this theorem for political theory. Theorists who wish to study the attributes of social-moral states of affairs should carry on, secure in the knowledge that Kakutani’s theorem poses no threat to this enterprise.</p> </div> </div> </div> Sean Ingham David Wiens Copyright (c) 2022 Sean Ingham, David Wiens 2022-11-28 2022-11-28 23 2 10.26556/jesp.v23i2.1971