Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> en-US jespmanagingeditor2@gmail.com (Stephanie Van Fossen) jespmanagingeditor2@gmail.com (Stephanie Van Fossen) Mon, 29 Mar 2021 16:41:40 +0000 OJS 3.2.0.3 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 An Occasionalist Response to Korman and Locke https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/1121 <p>Dan Korman and Dustin Locke argue that non-naturalists are rationally committed to withhold moral belief. A main principle in their argument, which they call EC*, can be read in either of two ways, which I call EC*-narrow and EC*-wide. I show that EC*-narrow is implausible. Then I show that, if Korman and Locke rely on EC*-wide to critique non-naturalism, then the critique fails. I explain how the availability of a view that I like to call <em>moral occasionalism </em>can be used to respond on the non-naturalist’s behalf to the EC*-wide version of the argument. I also show how moral occasionalism is more useful for this purpose than an alternative third-factor account, namely David Enoch’s pre-established harmony view.</p> David Killoren Copyright (c) 2020 David Killoren http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/1121 Mon, 29 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000 Is Deontic Evaluation Capable of Doing What it is For? https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/843 <p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Many philosophers think the distinctive function of deontic evaluation is to guide action. This idea is used in arguments for a range of substantive claims. In this paper, we entirely do one completely destructive thing and partly do one not entirely constructive thing. The first thing: we argue that there is an unrecognized gap between the claim that the function of deontic evaluation is to guide action and attempts to put that claim to use. We consider and reject four arguments intended to bridge this gap. The interim conclusion is thus that arguments starting with the claim that the function of deontic evaluation is to guide action have a lacuna. The second thing: we consider a different tack for making arguments of this sort work. We sketch a methodology one could accept that would do the trick. Unfortunately, as we’ll explain, although this methodology would bridge the gap in arguments that put claims about the function of deontic evaluation to work, it would do so in a way that vitiates any interest we might have in such arguments. As an aside, we’ll also point out how epistemologists, who have recently become interested in the function of epistemic evaluation, appear to already recognize this fact. The conclusion is hence a dilemma: either arguments from deontic function to substance have a lacuna or such arguments lack teeth.</span></p> Nathaniel Sharadin, Rob van Someren Greve Copyright (c) 2020 Nathaniel Sharadin http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/843 Mon, 29 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000 Does Deportation Infringe Rights? https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/972 <p>Consider the migrant who illegally crosses an international border, and suppose that agents of the state she has entered apprehend and detain her, and then forcibly return her to her country of origin. Some opponents of aggressive deportation policies believe that, barring unusual circumstances, this process of using coercion and force to expel the migrant is an infringement of the migrant’s rights. Many of those who disagree contend that, because a state has a right to enact and enforce immigration restrictions, most deportations do not infringe rights. This paper takes the position that, absent an adequate argument to the contrary, one can conclude presumptively that the typical deportation is an infringement of the migrant’s rights. Its primary aim is to show that certain serious arguments to the contrary are inadequate.</p> Kaila Draper Copyright (c) 2020 Kaila Draper http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/972 Mon, 29 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000 Territorial Exclusion https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/1070 <p>Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed.</p> Daniel Weltman Copyright (c) 2020 Daniel Weltman http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/1070 Mon, 29 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000 The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments against Judgment Subjectivism https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/886 <p>Judgment subjectivism is the view that&nbsp;<em>x</em> is good for&nbsp;<em>S</em> if and only if, because, and to the extent that&nbsp;<em>S</em> believes, under the proper conditions, that&nbsp;<em>x</em> is good for&nbsp;<em>S</em>. In this paper, I offer three related arguments against the theory. The arguments are about what judgment subjectivism implies about the well-being of welfare nihlists, people who do not believe that there are any welfare properties, or at least that none are instantiated. I maintain that welfare nihlists can be benefited and harmed. Judgment subjectivism is implausible because it implies otherwise.&nbsp;</p> Anthony Bernard Kelley Copyright (c) 2020 Anthony Bernard Kelley http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/886 Mon, 29 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000