Committing to Parenthood

Abstract

How do adults acquire the moral right to rear a child? In Luara Ferracioli’s new Parenting and the Goods of Childhood, she argues that adults acquire this right when they morally commit to a child. In this note, I’ll critically evaluate Ferracioli’s account. I’ll first describe the moral commitment view in further detail. After this, I’ll argue that it suffers from what I call the Swooping Problem. Contrary to Ferracioli’s defenses, her view permits adults to swoop in and acquire a right to rear a child just by asserting a moral commitment to them even when the mother is still gestating the child or when there is already an established parent-child relationship in place. Since these are undesirable and counterintuitive results, we should modify the moral commitment view to avoid them. Along the way, then, I’ll suggest ways Ferracioli could modify her view to avoid these objections.