LIBERALISM is often claimed to be at odds with feminism and critical race theory (CRT). On the one hand, many feminists and critical race theorists criticize liberalism for inadequately addressing oppression.¹ On the other, some contend that feminism and CRT conflict with liberal commitments to objectivity, fallibility, and pluralism.² In response, some argue that liberalism can be deracialized and feminist.³ Still, the most influential contemporary liberal political theory—John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness—has been criticized by feminists and CRT as a pernicious ideology that problematically abstracts away from historical and present-day injustice.⁴ These criticisms have been challenged.⁵ However, they remain common and have disseminated into popular discourse.⁶


³ Hartley and Watson, “Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?”; Hay, Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism; Mills, Black Rights/White Wrongs, 201–16, and “Occupy Liberalism!”


This paper argues that Rawlsian liberalism, far from being at odds with feminism and CRT, lends additional support to their central commitments. To be clear, I do not mean that feminism and CRT need a Rawlsian justification. My argument is merely that Rawlsian liberalism should be understood as their ally. This paper also recognizes that intersectional feminism and CRT are diverse, such that certain theoretical lenses sometimes utilized in these fields—such as Marxism or postmodernism—may not entirely align with Rawlsian liberalism. My argument does not erase or denigrate these differences. Instead, its point is merely that the central commitments of feminism, CRT, and Rawlsian liberalism converge far more than commonly recognized. Furthermore, or so I shall contend using recent findings in moral and social psychology, this may be of real practical importance. It may be vital to build bridges between liberalism, feminism, and CRT to achieve greater solidarity on the political left for dismantling oppression and undermining right-wing narratives opposed to social justice activism.

Section 1 argues that Rawlsian liberalism supports the central commitments of intersectional feminism. Section 2 argues that the same is true of CRT. Whereas sections 1 and 2 make these arguments programmatically, section 3 uses Iris Marion Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression”—a classic work widely utilized in feminism and CRT to theorize and contest diverse oppressions—to illustrate how Rawlsian liberalism supports similar goals and projects, and why it may be critical to achieve solidarity between feminism, CRT, and Rawlsian liberalism. Finally, section 4 responds to five objections, including concerns that my argument may violate requirements of justice related to “speaking for others,” allyship, epistemic appropriation, and intellectual gentrification. While I take these concerns very seriously, I contend that my argument only supports the work of marginalized scholars, activists, and groups in ways that may beneficially broaden solidarity and allyship in pursuit of eliminating all forms of oppression.

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Black Rights/White Wrongs, chs. 8 and 9; and Petri, “Sorry I Can’t Comment on the President’s Actions, I Just Remembered I’m Turning into a Bird.”


1. INTERSECTIONAL FEMINISM AS A LIBERAL REQUIREMENT OF FAIRNESS

Liberalism, as a rough approximation, takes “protecting and enhancing the freedom of the individual to be the central problem of politics.” Liberals generally agree on some things, such as individuals’ rights to free speech, freedom of religion, to vote, and so on. However, liberalism also has many variants, ranging from classical liberalism (which defends laissez-faire free markets), to liberal egalitarianism (which mandates fair distributions of socioeconomic goods), to cosmopolitan egalitarianism (which mandates global fairness). This means that “liberalism is more than one thing.” Nevertheless, many feminists and critical race theorists object to liberalism’s individualism and to John Rawls’s liberal-egalitarian theory for merely giving an ideal theory of a “fully just society” that abstracts away from injustices.

I believe there is real merit in criticisms of classical free-market liberalism, which Rawls’s liberal-egalitarian theory also opposes. Critics are also correct that Rawls never adequately addresses serious real-world injustices, including injustices concerning the Global South. However, as Rawls explains and others emphasize, ideal theory arguably plays a critical role in social-political philosophy: it provides a measure of how unjust a society (and the world more generally) is and has been in the past. Second, although Rawls recognized that addressing injustice is a further question of “nonideal theory,” other authors

9 Girvetz, Dagger, and Minogue, “Liberalism.”
10 Girvetz, Dagger, and Minogue, “Liberalism”; see especially the section titled “Rights.”
12 Courtland, Gaus, and Schmidt, “Liberalism.”
15 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls does address civil disobedience to unjust laws and conscientious refusal to obey unjust legal injunctions (319–46), and in The Law of Peoples, Rawls addresses just war theory and assisting “burdened societies” (pt. 3). However, Rawls fails to adequately address domestic, international, and global injustices more generally. See Arvan, “A Non-Ideal Theory of Justice,” “First Steps toward a Nonideal Theory of Justice,” and “Nonideal Justice as Nonideal Fairness”; Mills, “Ideal Theory’ as Ideology” and The Racial Contract. See also Phillips, “Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory.”
have taken up the task of extending Rawlsian liberalism to nonideal theory.\textsuperscript{17} We will now see that Rawlsian ideal and nonideal theory together support the central commitments of intersectional feminism.

1.1 Intersectionality and Inclusivity as Liberal Requirements of Fairness

Intersectionality is widely recognized in feminism and CRT as an important tool for recognizing, understanding, and dismantling injustice.\textsuperscript{18} However, its nature remains contested, and there is “incredible heterogeneity” in how it is understood.\textsuperscript{19} Whereas some interpret intersectionality as a theory of social kinds, experience, or oppression, others understand it in terms of multifactor analyses or causal modeling, and others still understand it as a critical praxis or advocacy strategy to inform inclusive social activism and solidarity politics.\textsuperscript{20} Fortunately, irrespective of these disagreements, intersectionality clearly sets a regulative ideal: it “requires activists and inquirers to treat existing classification schemes as if they are indefinitely mutually informing, with the specific aim of revealing and resisting inequality and injustice.”\textsuperscript{21} Intersectionality’s central insight is that social identities are interconnected, revealing intersecting axes of discrimination, disadvantage, and privilege faced by members of different social groups.\textsuperscript{22} For example, Black boys and men face specific oppressions—such as police profiling, violence, and mass incarceration—not simply as members of one oppressed social category (being Black) but instead due to specifically being \textit{Black males}.\textsuperscript{23} This is important for many reasons, including because it reveals that a social category (being male) that confers unjust privilege to members of some categories (e.g., White heterosexual cisgender men)

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Delgado and Stefancic, \textit{Critical Race Theory}, 10–12 and ch. 2; Evans and Lépinard, “Confronting Privileges in Feminist and Queer Movements”; and Gasdaglis and Madva, “Intersectionality as a Regulative Ideal.”
\item \textsuperscript{19} Collins and Bilge, \textit{Intersectionality}, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Gasdaglis and Madva, “Intersectionality as a Regulative Ideal,” 1288.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Coleman, “What’s Intersectionality?”
\item \textsuperscript{23} Curry, \textit{The Man-Not}. See also Alexander, \textit{The New Jim Crow}.
\end{itemize}
can generate unique forms of oppression for members of other identities (e.g., LGBTQIA+ men who are BIPOC [Black, Indigenous, or People of Color], etc.).

Intersectionality is also thought to support particular methods for understanding and combating injustice. First, it is thought to support standpoint epistemology. Because members of different intersecting groups experience different forms of oppression on a daily basis in ways that may be obscured from individuals in other social categories, members of particular oppressed groups appear to be better situated to recognize and understand those forms of oppression than members of other groups, particularly unjustly privileged groups.

Second, intersectionality is thought to require inclusivity, such as trans-inclusive feminism and transfeminism. For, if members of different social identities face different but overlapping forms of oppression and have epistemically privileged standpoints on those oppressions, then understanding and effectively combating all forms of injustice requires including members of all oppressed groups in theorizing and activism, without any forms of domination or exclusion.

However, as important as intersectionality is, one common concern is that it lacks a clear definition or criteria for distinguishing genuine forms of intersectional oppression from ersatz claims that may uphold unjust privilege. First, there is again “tremendous heterogeneity” in how intersectionality is understood, such that “if we were to ask . . . [scholars, policy advocates, practitioners, and activists], ‘What is intersectionality?’, we would get varied and sometimes contradictory answers.” As another book surveying the field explains:

When is intersectionality achieved . . . ? Is it a process, a challenge, or an objective that can be measured? . . . While intersectionality has become a central way to define and analyse feminist and queer movements, determining how to measure or capture, when, where, how, whether, and why intersectionality has been achieved, attained, or performed, remains an open, and debatable question.

To take two cases of problems these disagreements can generate, “gender-critical” feminists allege that trans-inclusive activism oppresses children and cis-women, and men’s rights activists allege that “toxic feminism” oppresses White

24 Yuval-Davis, “Dialogical Epistemology.”
27 See hooks, Feminist Theory.
28 Davis, “Intersectionality as Buzzword”; and Nash, “Re-Thinking Intersectionality.”
29 Collins and Bilge, Intersectionality, 1.
cisgender men. While many (rightly) find such arguments unpersuasive, other intersectional debates—such as whether Islamic veiling oppresses Muslim girls and women—remain “divisive and conflictual in the feminist movement.” Second, intersectional oppression is closely related to unjust privilege—since “for every oppressed group there is a group that is privileged in relation to that group.” However, while privilege is “usually taken to be intimately associated with ideas surrounding power, oppression, and inequality,” it is “also clear that the term is frequently deployed without any specificity and, moreover, . . . is often elided with ‘power.’” What is widely accepted is that “privilege is broadly understood as referring to ‘unearned’ advantages or benefits which society grants to individuals and specific groups . . . for example, white privilege or male privilege.” Yet this means that to fully understand intersectional privilege and oppression, we must know what makes socially conferred advantages unearned (an issue I return to shortly). Finally, insofar as some feminists follow Young in “displacing the distributive paradigm”—rejecting the notion that justice is primarily a matter of distributing rights, opportunities, and socioeconomic resources—some commentators “have been especially troubled by the decreasing focus on social inequality within intersectionality’s scholarship.”

Of course, some intersectional feminists have offered resolutions to these issues. For example, Elena Ruíz distinguishes “operative intersectionality”—which focuses on abstract, academic examinations of “the operation of power” and “identifying primary features of social identity subject to power variances in culture”—from intersectionality as a liberation epistemology, which focuses on decolonization and “critical examinations of lived experience . . . for the purposes of liberation from oppression.” Ruíz then contends that “criticisms of intersectionality are largely criticisms of operative intersectionality” and, thus,

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32 Higgins, “Three Hypotheses for Explaining the So-Called Oppression of Men”; Lépinard, *Feminist Trouble*, 32 and ch. 3; and Zanghellini, “Philosophical Problems with the Gender-Critical Feminist Argument against Trans Inclusion.”

33 Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, 42.


that “intersectional social theory is an important analytic tool . . . but not in its current academic usage.”

Other feminist nonideal theorists have offered detailed analyses of particular forms of unjust privilege and disadvantage—such as racial segregation, White feminism, and transnational missionary feminism—in efforts to clearly distinguish genuine from ersatz oppressions, often in ways that link oppression to distributional inequalities.

Still, because intersectionality’s nature remains contested, it would be a strong mark in favor of a theory of justice if it provided a compelling account of unearned benefits and clear principles for identifying, distinguishing, and evaluating different forms of intersectional oppression and privilege. As we will now see, Rawlsian liberalism not only supports intersectionality but can help with these issues through distributive justice arguments that support rather than supplant feminist analyses of power, privilege, and oppression.

Let us begin with the idea of unjust privilege as unearned social advantages. Rawls presents his liberal model of justice as fairness—the “original position”—as an account of precisely this. The original position’s “veil of ignorance” prevents citizens from using knowledge of their own identity (e.g., their race, gender, religion) to tailor principles of justice to their own unique advantage. It is thus a device that “ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged . . . by the outcome of natural chance or social contingencies.” This means that whichever principles of justice the parties to Rawls’s model agree to, those principles will specify what society must be like to ensure that no one is unjustly privileged.

We can see this further by examining the two principles that Rawls derives from the original position to define a just society:

(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and

(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).

Ruiz, “Framing Intersectionality,” 335.

See, e.g., Anderson, The Imperative of Integration; Khader, Decolonizing Universalism; and Lépinard, Feminist Trouble.


Rawls, A Theory of Justice, ch. 3.

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 11 (emphases added).

Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 42–43.
Rawls’s first principle—the equal basic liberty principle—entitles all members of society to equal legal protections of various liberties, including rights to free speech, freedom of association, freedom to run for political office, to vote, and so on. This principle also entitles everyone to the fair value of political liberties (the right to vote and run for political office), such that these liberties must have the same usefulness for each person. Rawls’s second principle then has two parts. Its first part, Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity (FEO) principle, holds that “in all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed.” Its second part, the difference principle, then holds that all other social and economic inequalities (principally, income and wealth) must be to the maximum advantage of society’s least-advantaged class. Finally, Rawls’s first principle has lexical priority over the second principle, such that inequalities of basic liberties cannot be justified by greater adherence to the second principle. Similarly, the FEO principle has lexical priority over the difference principle.

Bearing this and the role that Rawls argued that these principles should play as ideals in mind—as measures of how just a society is to guide social reform—let us return to intersectionality. Notice that Rawls’s principles provide clear grounds for determining which groups are unjustly privileged and to what extent and, conversely, which groups suffer which intersectional injustices and the relative severity thereof. This is not to say that Rawls’s principles are the only or best way to recognize intersecting axes of privilege and oppression—as identifying oppression often comes not from theory but from those who experience it directly. It is merely to say that Rawlsian ideal theory can help us understand how forms of intersectional oppression are also violations of liberal requirements of fairness.

For, consider Rawls’s equal basic liberty principle, which again holds that a just society would ensure that everyone enjoys equal basic rights and liberties and fair value of political liberties. This principle is nowhere close to satisfied

45 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 44.
48 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 266.
50 I thank Laura Wildemann Kane for encouraging me to highlight this.
in the United States.\(^5^1\) First, voting suppression and stark racial, gender, and socioeconomic inequalities in attaining political office violate the fair value of political liberties.\(^5^2\) Second, the war on drugs and curtailment of the basic liberties of Black people and other persons of color—including but not limited to racial profiling, pretext stops, and mass incarceration—show that these groups do not enjoy the same basic liberties to drive or walk down the street as more privileged groups.\(^5^3\) Third, racial disparities in sentencing and false convictions indicate that Black Americans do not enjoy equal protections of basic liberties in courts of law.\(^5^4\) Third, gays, lesbians, queer, and trans folk live in daily fear of violence against them on the basis of their identities and are underrepresented in political offices.\(^5^5\) Fourth, gender and sexuality disparities in sexual violence and the need for the #MeToo movement to hold perpetrators accountable indicate that women and LGBTQIA+ groups have not enjoyed the same protections of basic liberties to be free from sexual violence as men of privileged identities.\(^5^6\)

Rawls’s first principle not only recognizes these as injustices: it supports intersectional analyses of them. For example, Black men are profiled, arrested, and imprisoned at vastly higher rates than other groups.\(^5^7\) Similarly, although LGBTQIA+ folk face unjust violence, empirical studies show that different intersectional groups face different kinds and levels of it—with, for example, lesbians facing the highest levels of lifetime sexual-assault victimization but gay men the highest levels of childhood sexual assault.\(^5^8\) Rawls’s equal basic liberty principle supports recognizing these as intersectional oppressions—as different ways that persons of different intersecting identities are denied equal protections of basic rights and liberties.

\(^{51}\) Arvan, “Nonideal Justice as Nonideal Fairness,” 211.
\(^{52}\) Bentele and O’Brien, “Jim Crow 2.0?”; Schoen and Dzhanova, “These Two Charts Show the Lack of Diversity in the House and Senate”; and Zippia, “President Demographics and Statistics in the US.”
\(^{53}\) Alexander, The New Jim Crow.
\(^{54}\) Schmitt, Reedt, and Blackwell, “Demographic Differences in Sentencing”; and Stevens, “Race and Wrongful Convictions.”
\(^{55}\) Dinno, “Homicide Rates of Transgender Individuals in the United States”; and Rothman, Exner, and Baughman, “The Prevalence of Sexual Assault against People Who Identify as Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual in the United States.”
\(^{56}\) Coulter et al., “Prevalence of Past-Year Sexual Assault Victimization among Undergraduate Students.”
\(^{57}\) Tucker, “The Color of Mass Incarceration.”
\(^{58}\) Rothman, Exner, and Baughman, “The Prevalence of Sexual Assault against People Who Identify as Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual in the United States.”
Rawls’s second principle also supports intersectional analyses. Rawls’s FEO principle again holds that “in all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed.” As Leif Wenar explains, this means that within any type of occupation (generally specified) we should find that roughly one quarter of people in that occupation were born into the top 25% of the income distribution, one quarter were born into the second-highest 25% of the income distribution, one quarter were born into the second-lowest 25%, and one-quarter were born into the lowest 25%.

However, the FEO principle does not merely apply to socioeconomic class: it applies to all social categories, holding, for example, that justice requires society “to insure that the life prospects of racial minorities are not negatively impacted by the economic legacy of racial oppression.” Since, for example, Black trans women are underrepresented in positions of corporate leadership, Rawls’s FEO principle identifies this as a distinct form of oppression. Similarly, Rawls’s difference principle entails that if members of some intersecting social identities are disproportionately disadvantaged by unjust economic inequality (as indeed they are), then these too are forms of intersectional socioeconomic oppression.

Rawls’s principles also provide an attractive normative framework for comparing different forms of oppression. For, although all forms of oppression are unjust, Rawls’ theory holds that protecting the fair value of equal basic liberties is lexically more important than fair equality of opportunity and economic injustice. This means, for example, that even if we grant that the US is economically unjust, Rawls’s ideal theory entails that rectifying deprivations of equal basic liberties should be our highest priority, inequalities of opportunity our second-highest priority, and economic justice our third-highest priority. Yet this coheres with feminism and CRT, which generally recognize that intersectionality requires prioritizing the most oppressed.

59 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 44.
60 Wenar, “John Rawls,” sec. 4.3.
61 Shelby, “Race and Social Justice,” 1711, sec. 5. As Matthew notes, the FEO Principle “does not differentiate between disadvantages based on their source” (“Rawls and Racial Justice,” 247).
It is important to dispel here a common misconception about how Rawlsian liberalism understands society’s least-advantaged group. Although Rawls’s difference principle understands society’s least advantaged in purely economic terms, this is merely how Rawls understands the least advantaged in ideal theory—as Rawls takes it for granted that everyone in a just society would enjoy equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity.\(^{66}\) In contrast, in nonideal theory, Rawls holds that “we have a natural duty to remove any injustices, beginning with the most grievous as identified by the extent of the deviation from perfect justice.”\(^{67}\) This means that under unjust conditions, the most disadvantaged in Rawlsian liberalism are those who are denied equal basic liberties and are multiply marginalized (suffering, additionally, the worst forms of unfair equality of opportunity and socioeconomic injustice), namely, BIPOC and LGBTQIA+ groups. Yet it is widely recognized that justice requires prioritizing the most marginalized as such.\(^{68}\) Consequently, Rawls’s ideal theory provides an attractive liberal framework for understanding the nature and comparative severity of different intersecting forms of oppression.

We can also see here that another complaint about Rawls’s ideal theory is mistaken. Echoing Onora O’Neill’s complaint that ideal theories are a “grotesque parody” of the way the world is, Michael Goodhart writes:

> Conceiving of injustice as the absence or opposite of justice renders distant, static, or cerebral something that many people experience as immediate, dynamic, and visceral…. Theorizing injustice as an aberration or departure from ideal justice fundamentally mischaracterizes people’s sense and experience of injustice and misses or misapprehends its political character and significance.\(^{69}\)

However, our discussion suggests that Mariame Kaba has a more accurate take when writing:

> Let’s begin our abolitionist journey not with the question, “What do we have now, and how can we make it better?” Instead, let’s ask, “What can we imagine for ourselves and the world?” If we do that, then boundless possibilities of a more just world await us.\(^{70}\)


\(^{68}\) Táíwò, “Being-in-the-Room Privilege.”


\(^{70}\) Kaba, *We Do This ‘Til We Free Us*, 3.
It is an open question (well worth investigating) whether Rawlsian liberalism might support Kaba's prison and police abolitionism.\textsuperscript{71} If abolitionism is indeed necessary for ensuring equal basic liberties, then under Rawls's first principle of justice, liberalism requires it. But, although we cannot resolve this here, the point is that Rawls's rationale for ideal theory coheres with Kaba's advocacy for locating abolitionist activism in utopian imaginary thought. In "Justice: A Short Story," Kaba imagines a planet without police or prisons, "Small Place," that is visited by an astonished "Earth visitor."\textsuperscript{72} This story conveys—in a vivid, visceral, and systematic way—Kaba's vision of the vast gap between our world and a just world: an ideal world to realize through abolitionist activism. But this is directly analogous to Rawls's rationale for beginning with ideal theory:

Obviously the problems of . . . [nonideal theory] are the pressing and urgent matters. These are the things that we are faced with in everyday life. The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides . . . the only basis for the systematic grasp of these more pressing problems.\textsuperscript{73}

Indeed, if we want to know how far we need to go to achieve true justice, and if we want to know who has been oppressed, how badly, and who is unjustly privileged and to what extent—things that intersectionality's critics allege that its "murkiness" is ill-suited to do—then Rawls's ideal theory provides a clear, principled, and attractive framework for doing so.\textsuperscript{74} According to Rawlsian liberalism, insofar as Black males are killed, arrested, and imprisoned at astonishingly disproportionate rates (depriving them of their basic liberties), Black males endure some of the worst, most systemic, and long-lasting injustices of any social group. In addition, insofar as Black Americans face some of the most serious deprivations of health care and worst health-related mortality rates, insofar as Black women and Indigenous groups face uniquely serious health care disparities, and insofar as access to health care is increasingly recognized as a basic liberty, Rawlsian liberalism entails that these intersectional oppressions should be among our highest priorities to rectify as well.\textsuperscript{75} Although Rawlsian

\textsuperscript{71} N.b.: in what follows (and more broadly), I have sought to avoid unsound epistemic practices of reductive inclusion, i.e., interpolation and ossification, as defined by Dotson and Spencer, "Another Letter Long Delayed."

\textsuperscript{72} Kaba, \textit{We Do This 'Til We Free Us}, 157–63.

\textsuperscript{73} Rawls, \textit{A Theory of Justice}, 8 (emphases added).

\textsuperscript{74} See Davis, "Intersectionality as Buzzword"; and Nash, "Re-Thinking Intersectionality."

\textsuperscript{75} Manuel, "Racial/Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Health Care Use and Access"; Nesbitt and Palomarez, "Increasing Awareness and Education on Health Disparities for Health Care Providers"; and Orgera and Artiga, "Disparities in Health and Health Care."
liberalism explains these injustices in distributive terms, we will see in section 3 that its analysis substantially converges with feminist accounts that understand oppression in terms extending beyond the “distributive paradigm.”

Finally, Rawlsian theory also supports intersectionality in nonideal theory. To determine what Rawlsian liberalism requires in unjust conditions, Rawls’s original position must be reformulated as a “nonideal original position.” Next, as I have argued previously, the parties to this model should seek remedial “nonideal primary goods” that empower oppressed groups and their allies to rectify injustices. These goods include remedial social, political, and economic institutions ranging from the Civil Rights Act to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and educational equity reforms (including the Women’s Educational Equity Act), as well as grassroots activism that confers compensatory bargaining power on the oppressed and disseminates skills and information for effectively and equitably combating oppression. Yet these too are the kinds of things that feminism and CRT advocate: creating sociopolitical conditions that center and amplify the perspectives, voices, knowledge, and interests of intersectionally oppressed groups, particularly the most oppressed.

None of this is to say that Rawlsian liberalism should be understood as “the” justification for intersectionality, nor does it imply that a Rawlsian approach to intersectionality should displace distinctly feminist ones (I return to this in section 3). It is merely to say that Rawlsianism is a theoretical and practical ally of intersectional feminism.

1.2. Standpoint Epistemology, Allyship, and Epistemic Justice as Liberal Requirements of Fairness

Rawlsian liberalism has been alleged to be problematically ahistorical, abstracting away from historical and present-day injustices and the lived experience of

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80 Goodkind and Deacon, “Methodological Issues in Conducting Research with Refugee Women”; and Tuggle, “Towards a Moral Conception of Allyship.”
oppressed groups. Following the realization that injustice is intersectional, feminists and CRT argue that it is vital to center marginalized experiences. Specifically, because individuals of different social identities directly experience different forms of oppression on a daily basis—including how elements of society engage in and perpetuate those injustices—there are grounds for thinking that different oppressed groups occupy privileged epistemic standpoints on these matters that give their members access to truths that may be deeply obscured from individuals occupying other social categories.

However, are Rawls’s critics correct that Rawlsian liberalism problematically abstracts away from lived experience and the epistemic value of intersectional standpoints? Although in ideal theory Rawls reasons abstractly using the original position, in nonideal theory Rawls explicitly focuses on oppressed standpoints: “I have assumed that it is always those with the lesser liberty who must be compensated. We are always to appraise the situation from their point of view.”

Second, while Rawls never developed this much further, Rawlsian nonideal theorists have argued that justice as fairness does require centering the lived experiences of the oppressed precisely because of privileged epistemic features rooted in social situatedness.

Specifically, I have argued previously that the parties to a Rawlsian nonideal original position would treat opportunities to be involved in open, inclusive, and equitable grassroots movements in pursuit of just ideals (equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, etc.) as a nonideal primary good for combating injustice. The basic rationale for this is, first, that oppressed individuals living under unjust conditions directly experience the daily costs of injustice, and the parties to a nonideal original position know behind its veil of ignorance that they may turn out to be oppressed. Second, because oppressed individuals experience costs of injustice and social reform based on their positionality, the parties to a nonideal original position have grounds to treat the standpoints of individuals oppressed by injustice as epistemically privileged with respect

82 Ruiz, “Framing Intersectionality.”
84 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 218 (emphasis added).
to these phenomena. Third, because oppression comes in degrees and the parties know that they could turn out to be oppressed, Rawlsian nonideal theory supports prioritizing the perspectives, voices, and interests of the most oppressed. Yet these conclusions cohere with what feminist perspectives on standpoint epistemology and allyship have long advocated.

Finally, Rawlsian nonideal theory also provides liberal support for feminist insights into epistemic justice. As Byskov details, epistemic injustice comprises five conditions of unfairness: a disadvantage condition (unfair outcome), prejudice condition (unfair judgments about epistemic capacities), stakeholder condition (unfair denial of stakeholder rights), epistemic condition (unfair denial of knowledge), and social justice condition (unfair existing vulnerability). Insofar as Rawlsian liberalism holds that justice is fairness—and Rawlsian nonideal theory holds that fairness under unjust conditions requires prioritizing rather than denigrating the perspectives, voices, knowledge, and interests of the oppressed—Rawlsian liberalism can help explain why epistemic injustice is a form of unfairness that serves to uphold and compound preexisting forms of unjust unfairness (unequal basic liberties, unequal opportunities, and economic injustice) already faced by oppressed groups.

Thus, Rawlsian liberalism not only supports intersectionality: it provides a liberal justification for feminist standpoint epistemology, allyship, and epistemic justice.

2. CRITICAL RACE THEORY AS A LIBERAL REQUIREMENT OF FAIRNESS

Critical race theorists have criticized liberalism for “color-blindness” and “ignoring the problem of intersectionality” and Rawlsian liberalism for “whitewashing” history. Mills, in particular, has argued that liberalism problematically abstracts away from the history of colonialism, slavery, and racial oppression and that Rawls’s ideal theory of justice constitutes a problematic ideology that obscures how liberal ideals can support the unjust status quo. However, in
more recent work, Mills expresses optimism that Rawlsian liberalism can be adapted to correct for these problems. We will now see that he is right and, indeed, that Rawlsian liberalism coheres with the central commitments of CRT as it is understood today.

As with all theoretical frameworks, there may be significant disagreement over exactly what CRT’s commitments are, and it has been contended by some proponents that “critical race theory cannot be understood as an abstract set of ideas or principles.” At the same time, these proponents have enumerated the following “defining elements” of CRT:

1. Critical race theory recognizes that racism is endemic to American life.
2. Critical race theory expresses skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutrality, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy.
3. Critical race theory challenges ahistoricism and insists upon a contextual/historical analysis of the law.
4. Critical race theory insists on recognition of the experiential knowledge of people of color and our communities of origin in analyzing law and society.
5. Critical race theory is interdisciplinary and eclectic.
6. Critical race theory works toward the end of eliminating racial oppression as part of a broader goal of ending all forms of oppression.

Other “hallmark critical race theory themes” have been claimed by CRT proponents to include:

7. The thesis of interest convergence: that civil rights advances always coincide with and advance the self-interest of whites.
8. Revisionist history: replacing comfortable historical narratives with “ones that square more accurately with minorities’ experiences.”
9. Structural determinism: the view that structural elements of society (such as legal practice) result in predictable outcomes, such as slowing down social change, imposing costs of progress predominantly (and inequitably) on marginalized races, and upholding white supremacy.

94 Mills, Black Rights/White Wrongs, epilogue (as prologue).
95 Lawrence et al., “Introduction,” 3.
97 Bell, “Racial Remediation”; and Delgado and Stefancic, Critical Race Theory, 18.
We will return to diversity in CRT scholarship and activism in section 3—but for now, let us ask programmatically: Does Rawlsian liberalism support or oppose these defining or hallmark elements of CRT?

Let us begin with 1: whether Rawlsian liberalism recognizes racism as endemic to American life. As illustrated in section 1 and in the work of others applying Rawls to race, Rawls’s two principles of justice clearly entail that racism is and always has been endemic to American life. BIPOC groups have never enjoyed fully equal basic liberties (viz., Rawls’s first principle), fair equality of opportunity (viz., Rawls’s FEO principle), or economic justice (viz., Rawls’s difference principle).100 According to Rawls’s principles of ideal justice, then, severe racial injustices exist in the US today and have existed throughout America’s history.

Now turn to 2: whether Rawlsian liberalism supports or expresses skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutrality, objectivity, color-blindness, and meritocracy. It is often claimed that Rawls’s original position problematically supports these dominant claims.101 After all, the original position is supposed to be a neutral, “color-blind” procedure that does not permit anyone to take their race into account when deliberating about principles of justice.102 However, we need to be careful here. First, although in A Theory of Justice Rawls did present the original position as an “objective” model of justice that may also be understood as an interpretation of Kant’s (objective and ahistorical) moral principle “the categorical imperative,” Rawls also held that the original position represents our considered judgments here and now in the real world.103 Second, in his later work, Rawls firmly rejected the Kantian/objective grounding of justice as fairness, instead defending it as a political doctrine grounded in an overlapping consensus—or shared values—of citizens living under particular historical conditions: specifically, pluralist modern democracies characterized by diversity of thought and values.104 Rawls then claims that justice as fairness approximates such a consensus reasonably well, providing a conception of justice “for a constitutional democracy” that “will seem reasonable and useful, even if not fully convincing, to a wide range of thoughtful political opinions … [that] express an essential part of the common core of the democratic

101 Foster, “Rawls, Race, and Reason”; Oktay, Color-Blindness in Rawls’s Theory of Justice. See also Barndt, “The God Trick.”
102 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 4.
Finally, intersectional feminism and CRT actually appear to share the values that the original position models. Intersectional feminism and CRT both standardly understand justice as requiring equity—that is, the dismantling of unfair privileges. Yet Rawls’s principles clearly entail that White privilege, heterosexual cis-male privilege, ableism, and so on, are unjust privileges, just as intersectional feminism and CRT hold. We can begin to see how by carefully examining what Rawls’s original position represents and what its output principles require.

Consider 6: whether justice as fairness works toward eliminating racial oppression as part of a broader goal of ending all forms of oppression. Rawls’s original position is supposed to represent the common convictions of people who are committed to fairness: specifically, the convictions that a fully just society would be one in which no one is unfairly privileged based on social identity. Yet this is what feminism and CRT seek: an end to White privilege, cis-male privilege, and so on. Second, the original position’s output principles require society to be equitable, as they hold that members of all races, genders, and so on should enjoy the fair value of basic political rights, fair equality of opportunity, and a fair distribution of wealth, such that again no one is unfairly privileged. Yet equity as such is precisely what CRT espouses. Third, as we will see in section 3, Rawls’s just society would not plausibly contain any of Young’s “five faces of oppression”—and so would realize sociopolitical conditions where domination and oppression no longer exist. Fourth, these are merely Rawlsian liberalism’s implications within ideal theory. Recent extensions of justice as fairness to nonideal theory—that is, to the unjust world in which we live—reveal that rather than supporting “neutrality” or “color-blindness,” Rawlsian liberalism supports compensatory forms of equity, including remedial legal, political, and economic goods such as special legal rights and programs that prioritize the voices, perspectives, knowledge, and interests of the oppressed, both domestically and globally. Finally, far from supporting “meritocracy,” Rawlsian liberalism supports compensatory institutions to ensure equity, such as affirmative action and (potentially) rectification of historical injustices, such

105 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, xi.
106 Almeder, “Equity Feminism and Academic Feminism”; and Crenshaw et al., Critical Race Theory.
107 Matthew, “Rawls and Racial Justice” and “Rawls’s Ideal Theory.”
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as slavery. Rawlsian liberalism, then, does not reify oppressive conceptions of “neutrality, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy.” It holds that under unjust conditions, justice requires non-neutrality: legal, political, social, and economic goods that prioritize the oppressed over the privileged.

Now turn to 3: whether Rawlsian liberalism challenges ahistoricism and insists upon a contextual/historical analysis of the law. As Mills points out, A Theory of Justice does not contain a single reference to American slavery (though it does condemn historical slavery in the abstract). Although abstracting away from American slavery may seem problematic, we should recall Rawls’s purpose in providing an “ideal theory” of justice. The purpose is to provide a measure of injustice, including an explanation of why historical injustices are injustices (e.g., American slavery was unjust because it denied people equal basic liberties). Similarly, it is evident that Rawls’s liberal conception of international justice would identify colonialism as a grave historical injustice. First, using an international original position, Rawls derives the principle that “peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence is to be respected by other peoples.” Second, Rawls defends a minimal list of human rights—including a right against forced occupation—precisely to prevent paternalistic interference in “decent” illiberal societies. Third, although Rawls holds that outsiders do have duties to assist “burdened societies”—particularly societies that cannot satisfy the basic human right of subsistence (i.e., non-starvation) or violate the human rights of women—he is explicit that his “Law of Peoples” does not justify outsiders attempting to develop “pastoral” societies economically and that “advice” rather than force or occupation is to be used so as to avoid “improperly undermining a society’s religion and

110 See Adams, “Nonideal Justice, Fairness, and Affirmative Action”; Matthew, “Rawlsian Affirmative Action”; and Meshelski, “Procedural Justice and Affirmative Action.” Espinola and Vaca argue that Rawls’s theory does not necessarily require historical rectification and propose an amendment to the theory to better account for this moral requirement (“The Problem of Historical Rectification for Rawlsian Theory”). In contrast, I argue that when justice as fairness is extended to nonideal theory properly, it can be seen to require empowering members of oppressed groups to collectively and equitably decide whether and to what extent historical rectification should be pursued, given the costs and alternatives available (Arvan, “First Steps toward a Nonideal Theory of Justice,” 103, 107–14). This is, in effect, to afford the oppressed a kind of collective right to determine how to balance backward- and forward-looking aspects of justice. See also Arvan, “A Non-Ideal Theory of Justice.”

112 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 216, 247
113 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 37 and sec. 3.
Finally, Rawlsian liberalism again requires extending Rawls’s original position to nonideal theory—that is, to the conditions we actually live in, given the history and present of oppression, including racial oppression. And here, Rawlsian theory has been argued to support empowering marginalized groups to **collectively and equitably decide** whether and to what extent historical injustices should be rectified (such as reparations) as well as (globally) a higher-order human right to collectively and equitably decide the costs that they should have to face for the promotion of their first-order human rights.\(^{116}\) Insofar as Rawlsian ideal theory thus identifies colonialism as a grave injustice, and Rawlsian nonideal theory supports equitable grassroots activism to address its legacy, Rawlsian liberalism plausibly supports the general goals of decolonial feminism and CRT.\(^{117}\) So, Rawlsian liberalism is not problematically ahistorical. It provides a framework for **recognizing and rectifying** historical and present-day oppression.

Now turn to 4. Rawlsian liberalism as developed in nonideal theory wholeheartedly supports CRT’s insistence upon the “recognition of the experiential knowledge of people of color and our communities of origin in analyzing law and society.” As detailed in section 1, under unjust conditions, Rawlsian liberalism requires inclusively centering the voices, experiences, knowledge, and interests of the oppressed in grassroots deliberation precisely because, as a matter of equity, unjustly oppressed groups are owed compensation, and as a matter of epistemology, oppressed groups directly experience “nonideal costs” that other groups do not.\(^{118}\)

Now turn to 5. Rawlsian liberalism clearly supports interdisciplinary approaches to examining and dismantling oppression. In ideal theory, Rawls holds that the parties to the original position should be aware of “general facts about human society,” including “political affairs . . . principles of economic theory . . . [and] the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology.”\(^{119}\) Rawls holds that these interdisciplinary forms of knowledge are vital for evaluating a theory of justice, writing: “General facts of human psychology and principles of moral learning are relevant…. If a conception of justice is unlikely to generate its own support, or lacks stability, then this fact must not be

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\(^{117}\) Lugones, “Toward a Decolonial Feminism.”


overlooked.” Further, under unjust conditions, Rawlsian liberalism has again been shown to require developing and disseminating all-purpose skills and information related to effective and equitable social organizing, constructing remedial legal, social, political, and economic institutions to combat oppression, rationally understanding the costs and benefits of different policies and tactics, and distributing those costs equitably.

Now turn to 7: the thesis of interest convergence. Here, Rawlsian nonideal theory recognizes a deep tension within what justice requires under unjust conditions. On the one hand, individuals in a nonideal original position have grounds to prioritize the perspectives, voices, and interests of the oppressed, seeking to augment marginalized groups’ bargaining power to compensate for oppression. On the other hand, the parties also must take seriously the existence of dominant majorities and the fact that members of those majorities may be strongly inclined to prefer social reform only to the extent that they see reform to be consistent with what they take their “legitimate interests” to be. This suggests that social reform is more likely to occur via overlapping consensus between oppressed populations and sympathetic majorities—that is, by interest convergence. Rawlsian nonideal theory thus recognizes not only interest convergence but also the general idea (recognized by CRT) that this is a theoretical and practical problem—namely, how to square the fact of interest convergence with the idea that justice requires the opposite: prioritizing the oppressed. Further, although this is an area of ongoing research, as we see above, Rawlsian theory supports an answer to this quandary that coheres with the contemporary practice of CRT activism: namely, centering the voices and experiences of (multiply) marginalized groups and utilizing formal and informal “levers of power” to augment their social, economic, and legal bargaining power.

Rawlsian liberalism also supports 8: replacing comfortable historical narratives with ones that reflect marginalized minorities’ experiences. First, as established earlier, Rawlsian ideal theory recognizes slavery, racism, sexism, and so on as injustices—as serious, unjust deviations from what a fully just society would be. Second, as we have just seen, Rawlsian nonideal theory requires the

120 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 125.
122 Arvan, “Nonideal Justice as Nonideal Fairness,” 221.
distribution of all-purpose skills and information for understanding and combating injustice and amplifying the voices and perspectives of the oppressed due to their direct experience with oppression and “nonideal costs” thereof. Insofar as replacing false historical narratives with narratives that reflect the true history and marginalized experiences of oppression promises to do just this, Rawlsian liberalism supports the practice.

Finally, the same is true of 9. Insofar as Rawlsian nonideal theory supports the pursuit and dissemination of all-purpose knowledge related to understanding injustice and “nonideal costs,” Rawlsian liberalism supports understanding structural determinism: features of society that justly or unjustly determine social outcomes, such as rights, opportunities, income and wealth, mass incarceration, policing, and so on.

3. HOW RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM SUPPORTS DIVERSE FEMINIST AND CRITICAL RACE THEORY WORK TO DISMANTLE ALL FORMS OF OPPRESSION

Our examination thus far has been programmatic, showing at a high level of abstraction how Rawlsian liberalism supports central commitments of intersectional feminism and CRT. However, what about the great diversity of work in these fields? Does Rawlsian liberalism support the diverse projects of actual intersectional feminists and critical race theorists? We will now see that it does.

Iris Marion Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression” has been widely utilized in feminism and CRT to understand and contest many varieties of oppression. Young argues that “instead of focusing on distribution, a conception of justice should begin with the concepts of domination and oppression.” 126 Young then defines five types of domination and oppression:

*Exploitation:* “This oppression occurs through a steady process of the transfer of the results of labor from one social group to benefit another.” 127

*Marginalization:* “Marginals are people the system of labor cannot or will not use…. A whole category of people is expelled from useful participation in social life.” 128

*Powerlessness:* “The powerless are … those over whom power is exercised without their exercising it; the powerless are situated so that they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them.” 129

Cultural Imperialism: “To experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one’s group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other.”

Violence: “Members of some groups live with the knowledge that they must fear random, unprovoked attacks on their persons or property, which have no motive but to damage, humiliate, or destroy the person.”

The influence of Young’s framework on intersectional feminism and CRT can hardly be overstated. Among other things, it has been used to theorize ableism; ageism; anti-Arab and anti-Black racism; antiracist education; anti-oppressive citizenship education; biphobia; child protection reform; Christian privilege; colonialism; cultural appropriation; data justice; decolonial philosophical writing; educational injustice; fatphobia; food justice; hate speech; interspecies oppression; LGBTQA+ oppression; medical oppression; anti-oppressive, intersectional, and decolonial pedagogy; oppression resistance through the lens of carceral status; the politics of school violence; representation justice; and vegan ecofeminism.

130 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 58–59.
131 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 61.
Young claims that no single form of oppression can be assigned causal or moral primacy and that it is not possible to define any single set of criteria that unify different forms of oppression. Indeed, she challenges the “logic of identity,” or attempts to provide “totalizing systems in which . . . unifying categories are themselves unified under principles, where the ideal is to reduce everything to one first principle.” However, is Young right? Is there nothing that unifies her five faces of oppression? This seems false on its face: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and arbitrary group-directed violence are all unfair—indeed, profoundly so. But, of course, Rawls contends that justice is fairness. So, the question arises: Can we explain Young’s five faces of oppression—and justify the many anti-oppressive feminist and CRT projects enumerated above—by reference to liberal demands of fairness, holding that each form of oppression is a violation of this deeper value?

Indeed, we can. For let us ask: Would any of Young’s five forms of oppression exist in Rawls’s just society—that is, in a society in which all citizens have equal basic liberties (including the fair value of political liberties), fair equality of opportunity, and fair economic conditions? The answer is no. To see how, begin with exploitation. Would anyone be exploited in Rawls’s just society, where exploitation involves the “steady process of the transfer of the results of labor from one social group to benefit another”? Surely not. After all, Rawls’s general conception of justice—which his two principles of ideal theory are an instance of—holds:

All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage. The point of Rawls’s principles of ideal justice—the equal basic liberties principle, FEO principle, and difference principle—is to describe conditions that accomplish this, defining a society in which no one is exploited and everyone benefits fairly from social cooperation. As Rawls puts it, the difference principle does not involve the steady transfer of results of labor from one social group to the benefit of another (which Young takes to comprise exploitation).

133 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 40, 42
134 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 98.
135 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 54 (emphasis added).
Rather, the difference principle holds instead that “inequalities of wealth and authority . . . are just only if they result in *compensating benefits for everyone*.”\(^{137}\)

Now turn to marginalization. Would anyone be marginalized in Rawls’s just society? It is hard to see how. Rawls’s first principle holds that everyone must enjoy the fair value of political liberties, where this means “fair opportunity to take part in and to influence the political process” such that “those similarly endowed and motivated should have roughly the same chance of attaining positions of political authority irrespective of their economic and social class.”\(^{138}\) Consequently, no one would be *politically* marginalized in Rawls’s just society: everyone, regardless of race, gender, sexuality, socioeconomic class, and so on, would have roughly the same chance of influencing political decisions and rising to positions of political authority. Next, Rawls’s *FEO* principle holds that the basic structure of a just society must ensure the fair equality of economic opportunities: that everyone, regardless of race, gender, and so on, should have roughly the same chance of obtaining similar jobs, levels of employment, advancement in employment, and so on. So, no one would be *economically* marginalized in Rawls’s just society, either. But this is just to say, on Young’s own definition of marginalization, that no one would be marginalized in Rawls’s just society *tout court*. For, Young writes: “Marginals are people the system of labor cannot or will not use. . . . A whole category of people is expelled from useful participation in social life.” Clearly, for reasons just described, no one would satisfy this definition in Rawls’s just society—as everyone in Rawls’s just society would have fair access to participation in society’s system of labor, and no one would be expelled from effective participation in sociopolitical life.\(^{139}\)

What about powerlessness? Would any group be powerless in Rawls’s just society? No. First, Rawls’s first principle requires everyone to enjoy the fair value of political liberties, such that everyone would have roughly equal chances to influence political processes, be elected to political office, and so on. Second, Rawls’s *FEO* principle holds that people of all backgrounds should have roughly equal chances of rising to positions of power and authority in the economic sphere. Finally, Rawls holds that the *FEO* and difference principles support *property-owning democracy*, a socioeconomic system “ensuring

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\(^{139}\) One potential exception to this might be dependents such as children and individuals with disabilities that require dependence on others. As Kittay argues, Rawls makes no clear provision for these anywhere in his theory of justice (*Love’s Labor* and “*Love’s Labor Revisited*”). Yet as Bhandary argues, Rawls’s theory can be plausibly supplemented to accommodate dependency ("Dependency in Justice").
the widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital (educated abilities and trained skills).”140 Rawls adds:

In a property-owning democracy . . . basic institutions must from the outset put in the hands of citizens generally, and not only of a few, the productive means to be fully cooperating members of a society. The emphasis falls on the steady dispersal over time of the ownership of capital and resources by the laws of inheritance and bequest, on fair equality of opportunity secured by provisions for education and training.141

A property-owning democracy is thus a society in which Young’s definition of powerlessness applies to no one. In such a society, capital would be widely dispersed so that no one has to work at (say) Amazon or Walmart, taking orders but never giving them. Instead, virtually every citizen in Rawls’s just society could feasibly start a small, sustainable business, have a fair chance to influence political processes and be elected to political office, and so on. So, no one would be powerless: everyone would have fair access to socio-political-economic power.

What about cultural imperialism? Would anyone in Rawls’s just society “experience how the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one’s group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other”? Surely not. For, if we take Rawls’s equal basic liberties (and the fair value of political liberties) and FEO principles seriously, there would be no “dominant group(s)” in Rawls’s just society. All groups would be similarly situated with respect to political power and influence and to positions of socioeconomic power and privilege.

Finally, what about arbitrary, group-directed violence? Would a society whose basic structure satisfied Rawls’s principles result in arbitrary group-directed violence? It is hard to see how, as Rawls argues that all segments of society would see a society governed by Rawls’s principles as a fair deal—one that would thereby cultivate a sense of justice and reciprocity among them rather than envy or spite (things that plausibly motivate group-directed violence).142

But now if this is right—if Rawls’s ideal theory describes conditions in which none of Young’s five forms of oppression would exist—then Rawlsian liberalism accomplishes what Young denies is possible: it provides a unified explanation that grounds domination and oppression in distributive unfairness.143

140 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, xv.
141 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, xv (emphases added).
142 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 156–57, and ch. 9.
143 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, ch. 1.
According to Rawlsian liberalism, the diverse forms of oppression that feminists and CRT contest—ranging from ableism to colonialism, racism, sexism, and beyond—are all unjust because they involve unfair inequalities of basic liberties, opportunities, wealth, and income. Finally, in nonideal theory, Rawlsian liberalism aims to dismantle these oppressions, which range from the White supremacist “racial contract” to the patriarchal “sexual contract” and beyond.\textsuperscript{144} For in nonideal theory, we again find deep affinities between Rawlsian liberalism, Young’s five faces of oppression, and the many diverse projects pursued in feminism and CRT using her framework. First, Young defends “an enabling conception of justice,” which holds that in addition to redistributing wealth and power, justice requires a dialogic, communicative ethics that empowers marginalized groups to bring particularities of their experiences of domination and oppression to challenge structural domination and oppression.\textsuperscript{145} Second, Young argues that justice thus requires democratizing public life in a way that satisfies a principle of representation that centers marginalized voices and perspectives.\textsuperscript{146} Third, Young thus defends “a dual system of rights: a general system of rights which are the same for all, and a more specific system of group-conscious policies and rights.”\textsuperscript{147} Yet as we have seen, Rawlsian nonideal theory supports all of these conclusions.\textsuperscript{148} So, Rawlsian liberalism provides another basis for critiquing precisely what feminism and CRT challenge across a diverse range of projects: the modern-day welfare state founded on histories of ableism, colonialism, sexism, racism, LGBTQIA+-phobia, and so on. Finally, the Rawlsian value basis for critiquing and dismantling these oppressions again converges with feminism and CRT: the relevant value being fairness/equity.\textsuperscript{149}

Critically, none of this implies that Rawlsian liberalism should displace Young’s framework or the diverse feminist and CRT work utilizing it. First, different approaches to political philosophy approach justice from fruitfully different starting-points.\textsuperscript{150} Whereas Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium aims to bring our considered judgments about justice into greater coherence in pursuit of overlapping consensus, feminism takes women, gender, 

\textsuperscript{145} Young, \textit{Justice and the Politics of Difference}, 39, 106–9.
\textsuperscript{146} Young, \textit{Justice and the Politics of Difference}, 184.
\textsuperscript{147} Young, \textit{Justice and the Politics of Difference}, 174.
\textsuperscript{148} Arvan, “First Steps toward a Nonideal Theory of Justice” and “Nonideal Justice as Nonideal Fairness.”
\textsuperscript{149} Rawls, \textit{Political Liberalism}, 28, and \textit{A Theory of Justice}, 16.
\textsuperscript{150} Floyd, “Political Philosophy’s Methodological Moment and the Rise of Public Political Philosophy.”
consciousness-raising, and advocacy as foci of analyses, and critical theory examines how laws and other features of society uphold an unjust (e.g., racist) status quo.151 Second, if Rawlsian liberalism is correct, then all of Young’s five forms of oppression really are injustices: they are different forms of sociopolitical unfairness. Third, insofar as many decades of feminist and CRT projects and activism have analyzed, deconstructed, and developed useful discourses and strategies for dismantling various oppressions—something that, to be clear, Rawlsian liberalism has mostly not done (as Mills is correct that most Rawlsian work has been in ideal theory)—this paper’s argument shows that Rawlsian liberalism, intersectional feminism, and CRT complement each other. On the one hand, Rawlsian liberalism has much to offer feminism and CRT: a distinctly liberal analysis of oppression as unfairness and liberal justification for diverse feminist and CRT projects. On the other, feminism and CRT have much to offer Rawlsian liberals: decades of painstaking, ongoing theoretical and activist work identifying, deconstructing, and dismantling unfair oppressions. Finally, there are empirical reasons to think that allying feminism, CRT, and liberalism as such may be of great practical importance. First, empirical psychological findings indicate that violations of what people perceive to be requirements of fairness motivate people to engage in punishment and retaliation.152 Conversely, procedural fairness is known to foster cooperativeness.153 Third, these findings appear to generalize to other primates.154 This suggests that to effectively dismantle injustice, we should do so in ways perceived to be fair. Yet opponents of feminism and CRT appear to be increasingly successful in casting them as illiberal and unfair.155 Opposition to CRT appears to have been instrumental to the Republican candidate winning the 2021 election for governor of Virginia and to have roughly tripled local school board recalls.156 While I am not so naive to suggest that using Rawlsian liberalism to support feminism and


153 De Cremer and Van Knippenberg, “How Do Leaders Promote Cooperation”; and De Cremer and Tyler, “The Effects of Trust in Authority and Procedural Fairness on Cooperation.”

154 Yamamoto and Takimoto, “Empathy and Fairness.”


156 Ballotpedia, “School Board Recalls”; and Smith, “How Did Republicans Turn Critical Race Theory into a Winning Electoral Issue?”
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CRT would eliminate these counterreactive forces, there are several grounds to think that it may help. First, liberalism is clearly a dominant ideology in Western culture. Second, as just noted, perceived fairness motivates cooperation and perceived unfairness provokes resistance. Third, although many feminist and critical race theorists explicitly invoke the language and resources of postmodernism and Marxism, critics of feminism and CRT routinely (and seemingly effectively) depict feminism and CRT as illiberal and “un-American” on these grounds. Fourth, persistent divisions on the political left—often derisively referred to as a “circular firing squad”—plausibly undermine broad-based solidarity necessary for more effectively dismantling oppression and combating right-wing resistance. Consequently, there are empirical grounds to believe that if we want to realize a more just world—rather than perpetuate counterproductive division and retaliation—the best way to do so may be to show how feminism and CRT are genuinely liberal, seeking a _fair and equitable_ world in a _fair and equitable_ way.

### 4. Replies to Five Objections

I foresee at least five related objections. First, my argument might seem problematically _post hoc_, at most showing how Rawlsian liberalism can “support” feminism and CRT long after the many insights of these fields have been developed by marginalized thinkers and activists. Second, this article might be thought to engage in epistemic appropriation, unjustly detaching epistemic resources developed by marginalized knowers in ways that benefit the powerful—in this case, Rawlsian liberals. Third, my argument might be said to constitute a failure of allyship, as allies to marginalized groups have duties to “decenter” their own voices and perspectives, using their positional privilege instead to amplify marginalized voices. Fourth, this paper might be said to constitute an unjust form of “speaking for” marginalized individuals and groups. Finally, my argument might be claimed to be yet another example of CRT’s gentrification, where

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158 Pengelly, “Barack Obama Warns Progressives to Avoid ‘Circular Firing Squad’”; and Scholz, _Political Solidarity_.

159 Davis, “On Epistemic Appropriation.”


161 Trebilcot, “Dyke Methods.” See also Minh-ha, _Woman, Native, Other_.

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CRT is “watered down” by the “readiness of white liberals to tout themselves and their scholarship as ‘off-label’ uses of CRT methodology.”¹⁶²

These are all very serious concerns—and if I have erred in any (or all) of these ways, then I accept the responsibility thereunto. However, any work in moral and political philosophy takes moral risks, and I have chosen to hazard these risks because I sincerely believe that it may be of real practical importance—indeed, important to realizing justice—to understand the extent to which feminism, CRT, and Rawlsian liberalism converge.¹⁶³ As Alcoff argues:

> The source of a claim or discursive practice in suspect motives or maneuvers or in privileged social locations … though it is always relevant, cannot be sufficient to repudiate it. We must ask further questions about its effects, questions which amount to the following: will it enable the empowerment of oppressed peoples?¹⁶⁴

I have written this paper not merely because I believe its argument is sound but because I believe that greater solidarity between feminism, CRT, and liberalism may be necessary for better empowering oppressed peoples and combating injustice. First, there is ample empirical evidence that when in-group or out-group members are thought to violate a particular group’s norms—such as feminists and critical race theorists denying liberal norms or liberals denying feminist and CRT norms—it tends to activate the fight-flight-freeze system, generating anger, confrontation, and exclusion.¹⁶⁵ Second, while righteous anger plausibly has legitimate purposes in justice activism, there are also grounds to think that anger toward feminism and CRT can significantly set back their causes.¹⁶⁶ For again, one common type of rhetoric used to vilify contemporary feminism and CRT is that they are “illiberal.”¹⁶⁷ This rhetoric plausibly affects how many citizens view feminism and CRT, as well as how they vote—it appears to have swung recent elections in favor of Republicans.¹⁶⁸ These phenomena thus

¹⁶² Curry, “Racism and the Equality Delusion.”
¹⁶³ Brennan and Freiman, “Moral Philosophy’s Moral Risk.”
¹⁶⁵ Dittrich et al., “You Gotta Fight!”
¹⁶⁶ Cherry, The Case for Rage.
plausibly stand in the way of feminist and CRT goals: eliminating all forms of oppression. Consequently, if our concern is to realize justice, we should combat these counterreactionary forces effectively rather than poorly. The question then is: What is the most effective way to combat reactionary right-wing politics and advance the goals of intersectional feminism and CRT? Tommy J. Curry suggests the “militant and revolutionary strategies of Black radicals” and the “praxis of struggle against systems of racist and neo-colonial oppression.”¹⁶⁹ Yet some recent findings suggest that militant methods may have the unintended consequence of driving more people to favor White right-wing nationalism.¹⁷⁰ Further, Derrick Bell Jr. (whose work Curry rightly demands serious engagement with) writes that because racial progress only tends to occur when it advances the interests of the White majority,

the *harsh and perhaps unsettling truths* in those historically enlightened lessons should become essential elements in racial remediation plans and policies for they reveal clearly: … [among several other things Bell lists] the necessity of remediation strategies that are *pragmatic and flexible*. *Undue commitment to ideology*, whether integration or separation, direct action or emigration, serve better individual actors rather than those for whom they claim to act.¹⁷¹

None of this is to say that revolutionary Black radicalism should be dismissed or denigrated. On the contrary, those of us concerned with justice should presumably utilize every potentially useful tool in our arsenal. My argument is merely that there are reasons to think that the central goals and commitments of intersectional feminism, CRT, and Rawlsian liberalism largely converge and that expounding upon this may be of real practical importance in advancing justice. For if, as I have argued, we can make a convincing case that liberals should support central insights from feminism and CRT, then we may have a better chance of overcoming harmful (and incorrect) narratives opposing feminism and CRT, which could gain more self-professed liberals as allies. While we should take seriously the concern that “broadening the progressive tent” in this way could amount to a kind of gentrification, we should also be open to the possibility that it might be a particularly effective way to advance the cause of justice—especially given the empirical findings on human motivation discussed above.

¹⁶⁹ Curry, “Racism and the Equality Delusion.”
¹⁷¹ Bell, “Racial Remediation,” 28 (emphases added).
Finally, I am optimistic that, so understood, this project has not engaged
in harmful or unjust forms of epistemic appropriation, failure of allyship, or
speaking for others. First, this article has supported the insights of marginalized
scholars and activists, which is different than appropriating them. Emmalon
Davis defines unjust epistemic appropriation as occurring when:

1. Epistemic resources developed within the margins are overtly detached
   from the marginalized knowers responsible for their production; and
2. Utilized in dominant discourses in ways that disproportionately benefit
   the powerful.\textsuperscript{172}

This paper has done neither. First, I have presented insights from intersectional
feminism and \textit{CRT} to be the achievements of those fields. Until recently, Rawl-
sian scholarship focused primarily on ideal theory, neglecting injustice. These
were real failures of Rawlsian liberalism, and feminism and \textit{CRT} played critical
roles in revealing them to be serious failures. Second, however, these critiques
appear to be precisely what led Rawlsian liberalism to focus more on nonideal
theory: that is, on the realities of oppression. Rawlsian liberals have thus listened
to and learned from feminism and \textit{CRT}—which is a good thing: a sign
of progress. Third, Rawlsian nonideal theorists have theorized in ways that
aim to benefit the marginalized, not the powerful (e.g., by supporting feminist
and \textit{CRT} insights in theory and activism). Fourth, many Rawlsian scholars who
have engaged in these projects are themselves marginalized knowers arguing
that Rawlsian liberalism has much of value to offer in the pursuit of racial and
gender justice.\textsuperscript{173}

Similar considerations, I believe, relate to questions of allyship and “speaking
for.” Although this paper has in one obvious sense inserted “dominant”
voices and perspectives into the picture (e.g., Rawlsian liberalism), it has aimed
to use this position of power and privilege to advance the insights and voices
of the historically and presently marginalized, which is what proper allyship is
generally argued to involve. As Alcoff argues, sound allyship cannot plausibly
involve staying silent or abandoning one’s position of privilege (the latter of
which is impossible in a world with structural injustice). Instead, power and

\textsuperscript{172} Davis, “On Epistemic Appropriation,” 702 (emphases added).

\textsuperscript{173} Espindola and Vaca, “The Problem of Historical Rectification for Rawlsian Theory”;
Krishnamurthy, “Completing Rawls’s Arguments for Equal Political Liberty and Its Fair
Value” and “Reconceiving Rawls’s Arguments for Equal Political Liberty and Its Fair
Value”; Matthew, “Rawlsian Affirmative Action,” “Rawls and Racial Justice,” and “Rawls’s
Ideal Theory”; Mills, \textit{Black Rights/White Wrongs}, ch. 9, epilogue, and “Occupy Liberal-
ism!”; and Shelby, \textit{Dark Ghettos}, “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto,” and “Race and
Social Justice.”
privilege (including dominant ideologies, such as liberalism) can be powerful tools for advancing the cause of justice, at least if used in the right way. For example, Audre Lorde is rightly lauded for affirming that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”—and there is doubtless an important insight here: namely, that a master’s tools alone will never dismantle a master’s house.¹⁷⁴ To fully dismantle a master’s house, their slaves must be liberated. Still, as Mills argues, we should be careful not to take Lorde’s point further than its weight can bear:

Imagine we’re a group of escaped slaves who have begun by dismantling the master (presumably using our own tools) and now wish to move on to his house. Hunting around the plantation, we come across a toolshed of hammers, pickaxes, saws, barrels of gunpowder, and so forth. Cannot we take these tools and—hammering, digging, sawing in half, blowing up—demolish the master’s house? Of course we can—you just watch.¹⁷⁵

Indeed, depending on the other tools that are available, it may well be a mistake not to appropriate at least some of the master’s tools. This has been this paper’s aim. If I am correct, Rawlsian liberals should support feminism and CRT as genuine allies in pursuit of justice: not by supplanting marginalized voices, perspectives, knowledge, or theories but by providing them distinctly liberal support in pursuit of a common, just cause: eliminating all forms of oppression. Used in this way, Rawlsian liberalism can be a good tool indeed.¹⁷⁶

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¹⁷⁴ Lorde, “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House.”

¹⁷⁵ Mills, “Rousseau, the Master’s Tools, and Anti-Contractarian Contractarianism,” 93.

¹⁷⁶ I thank Laura Wildemann Kane, the editors of the *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, several anonymous reviewers, and audiences at the Association for Social and Political Philosophy “Crises of Liberalism?” workshop and After Justice: John Rawls’ Legacy in the 21st Century conference.


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