Definitions belong to the definers, not the defined.
—Toni Morrison, *Beloved*

Adrian Piper provides an innovative way to think about stereotyping and how it leads to discrimination. Piper elucidates two kinds of discrimination—namely, first-order and higher-order political discrimination. Both rely on stereotypes that are motivated by xenophobia. The relationship between stereotyping and discrimination can be captured by what I refer to as discrimination from descriptive stereotyping. Here, stereotypical properties are taken to be possessed by and principally define individuals because of groups to which they belong. These properties are descriptive in nature; they describe what group members must be like. Discrimination results from and is thought to be justified by the perception that group members must possess certain negatively valued attributes because they belong to groups.

In this article I discuss a relationship between stereotyping and discrimination that has been rather overlooked, particularly in philosophical literature. I refer to the relationship as “discrimination from normative stereotyping.” On my account, stereotypes provide criteria for what legitimate members of some group are like, and thus which attributes group members ought to possess. Discrimination results from a failure of group members to possess these stereotypical attributes. Negative evaluations that lead to discrimination are not made insofar as group members are thought to possess disvalued attributes, but are made insofar as group members lack certain valuable, group-related attributes. Herein I take discrimination from normative stereotyping to explain the use of particular slurs—namely, race-traitor terms such as “Uncle Tom” and “nigger lover.” Targets of these slurs are discriminated against because they are perceived as failing to be legitimate group members insofar as they lack certain properties stereotypically imposed on their group.

In fleshing out an account of normative stereotyping that leads to discrimination, I begin by briefly reconstructing Piper’s view. I highlight her two kinds of

1. Piper, “Higher-Order Discrimination” and “Two Kinds of Discrimination.”
political discrimination (first-order and higher-order discrimination) and show how they derive from descriptive stereotyping. In a subsequent section I discuss normative stereotyping that leads to discrimination, and illustrate first-order and higher-order kinds of discrimination from normative stereotyping. In so doing, I show how first-order discrimination from normative stereotyping captures the use of “race traitor” and a few race-traitor terms.2

1. “IS IT BECAUSE I’M BLACK?”—ON DESCRIPTIVE STEREOTYPING

Piper discusses discrimination in two senses—namely, cognitive and political. Cognitive discrimination is the capacity to distinguish and respond to different properties or objects in an appropriate way. Political discrimination is failed cognitive discrimination that is enacted upon. It is a manifest “attitude in which a particular property of a person which is irrelevant to judgments of that person’s intrinsic value or competence . . . is seen as a source of disvalue or incompetence; in general, as a source of inferiority.”3

Piper takes political discrimination to be motivated by xenophobia, which is a specific kind of pseudorationality. Pseudorationality is an attempt to make sense of anomalous data in a way that preserves one’s rational subjectivity when it is under duress. Xenophobia is an attempt to preserve one’s rational subjectivity in the face of perceptions that threaten it because of the xenophobe’s narrow conception of personhood.4 It is a fear of “certain kinds of strangers, namely those who do not conform to one’s preconceptions about how persons ought to look or behave.”5 Insofar as these strangers possess attributes that threaten the internal coherence of the xenophobe’s conception of personhood, they threaten the internal coherence of the xenophobe’s rational subjectivity. Instead of revising or jettisoning their inadequate conception, xenophobes rationalize or dissociate personhood away from the “others,” or simply deny the “others” personhood altogether.6 Committed xenophobes—those who have a personal investment

2 I attempt to capture “thicker” or “harder” race-traitor terms. I work out a theory of “thinner” or “softer” race-traitor terms such as “oreo,” “wigger,” and “banana” in a forthcoming work.
4 Piper understands “personhood” to be a property attributed to beings who are presumed as having consciousness, thought, rationality, and agency. She does not intend to call up issues of reidentification or characterization that accord to traditional questions of personal identity.
6 By “rationalization” Piper means maximizing certain properties that confirm a diminished conception of personhood, while minimizing others that support personhood. By “dissociation” Piper means identifying a being without the necessary properties needed to possess
in perceiving only some humans as possessing personhood—explicitly impose stereotypes on others in a way that denies them personhood.

Now to “impose a stereotype on someone is to view her as embodying a limited set of properties falsely taken to be exclusive, definitive, and paradigmatic of a certain kind of individual.”7 One fails to appreciate the complexity of group members, and instead takes certain properties to be present in and principally define them without further investigation. Stereotypes tell us what members must be like, and why some members cannot possess personhood. One need not get to know individuals; one already has knowledge that neither requires confirmation by engagement nor is ever incorrect.

The application of stereotypes to groups leads to political discrimination. For Piper there are two kinds of political discrimination. First-order political discrimination regards one’s unashamed commitment to a very narrow conception of personhood that serves some interest. The committed xenophobe unashamedly takes attributes of some person that are irrelevant to judgments of that person’s noninstrumental value or competence to be the source of inferiority, and acts on that basis. Higher-order political discrimination is an implicit commitment to a very narrow conception of personhood that, if discovered, would evoke shame in the discriminator. It is “the attitude within which a primary disvalued or valued property in turn confers disvalue or value respectively on further properties of the disvaluee or valuee respectively.”8 Certain secondary attributes—say eloquence in speech—that may be valued in someone with a primary valued attribute—say whiteness—become disvalued because they are attributes of someone with a primary disvalued attribute—say Blackness. So, speaking eloquently is valuable, and is taken to be so when the person possessing the attribute is white. However, in someone who is Black, “eloquence” becomes “flowery” or “highfalutin.”

I imagine that assigning disvalue or value to higher-order attributes can regard interests and commitments. For example, if some professor wants to increase representation of some marginalized group, say Black women, and the professor has the primary valued attribute of whiteness (and particularly if male), then he is perceived as “passionate for justice” by particular persons. But when some professor wants to increase the representation of the same marginalized group, and the professor has the primary disvalued attribute of Blackness (and particularly if female), then she is perceived as “obsessed with injustice” by the

---

7 Piper, “Two Kinds of Discrimination,” 207.
same persons. The former is perceived as desiring to press forward to a new and progressive future, while the latter is perceived as refusing to let go or move beyond the past. Though disguised, the evaluations derive from the primary valued or disvalued attributes. In these cases the higher-order political discriminator’s self-concept relies on not being a xenophobe, and thus they cannot consciously accept that the agent’s primary attributes “Blackness” and “femaleness” are conferring the disvalue. Their xenophobic actions must be suppressed or denied.

Piper’s first-order and (perhaps surprisingly) higher-order political discriminations involve stereotyping that follows a certain form, call it “discrimination from descriptive stereotyping.” Discrimination from descriptive stereotyping accords to the following:

1. Members of group X have trait/attribute Y (which is negatively valued).
2. Person A is a member of group X.
3. Therefore, person A has (or rather must have) trait/attribute Y (which is negatively valued).
4. Discrimination results from discriminator D’s perception that A is a member of X, and therefore must possess the negatively valued trait/attribute by virtue of being a member of X.

That Piper’s first-order and higher-order political discriminations involve descriptive stereotyping is implicated by her claim regarding what it means to impose a stereotype. Further, consider what stereotypes do. They equate one very limited set of properties with personhood, and exclude any other property that does not fit within that set. In so doing they exclude individuals who are not perceived as possessing all and only those properties of the limited set, attributing to them certain properties that clearly demarcate the deviance. This creates what she calls “honorific” and “derogatory” properties. Whether honorific or derogatory, these stereotypical properties are taken to be possessed by those on whom they are imposed. Thus for Piper, stereotypes take descriptive properties to—of necessity—exist in individuals because of groups to which they belong. Discrimination results from the perception that members of groups must possess—in fact are defined by—derogatory properties.

Let us say that “whiteness” is perceived as a primary valued attribute included (among others) in the limited set of properties that would confer personhood to someone. “Blackness” is excluded. Honorific stereotypes (perhaps “intelligence,” among others) are created for those who are white. Derogatory stereotyping...

---

9 Carbado and Gulati illustrate this by appeal to the perception of Black and white male law professors’ pedagogical approaches. See Carbado and Gulati, Acting White? 36.

types (perhaps, “unintelligence,” among others) are created for Blacks to mark off their deviance from whiteness. These stereotypes describe what individuals must be like by virtue of being Black. Discrimination against those with derogatory stereotypes is perceived as justified on that basis.

So $M$ is Black and is applying for employment as a teacher at some institution. Piper’s understanding of stereotyping and the political discrimination to which stereotyping leads can be captured as follows:

1. “Blacks” are unintelligent.
2. $M$ is “Black.”
3. Therefore, $M$ is (and must be) unintelligent by virtue of being Black.
4. Political discrimination (regarding $M$’s potential employment, say as a teacher) results from and is justified by $M$’s unintelligence that is owed to his being Black.

These of course follow from the first-order discriminator (xenophobe) fixing the concept “personhood” by a very limited set of properties that Blacks do not possess.

On its face, higher-order discrimination should not follow this form. Higher-order political discriminators reject the imposition of stereotypes. Further, higher-order political discriminators would be appalled and indignant upon discovery of such stereotyping, either in themselves or as practiced by others. They would consciously deny the truth of 1 and 3, and reject 4 on moral grounds. And yet, there is just something about the way in which $M$ performs some action that is evidence of him being unfit in some way. Possession of an otherwise valuable property is perceived negatively, and justifies the resulting discriminatory act.

So “eloquence in speech” is seen as a valuable property in white teachers. However, the higher-order political discriminator may perceive it as “flowery” or “pretentious,” but this is explained by the suppressed perception that Blacks are unintelligent, and by $M$’s being Black. And so higher-order political discriminators appeal to the same form as first-order discriminators. The only difference is that the higher-order discriminator denies or suppresses their xenophobic reactions by attributing disvalue to higher-order properties—properties that preserve the discriminator’s self-concept.

I take Piper’s discussion of political discrimination to derive from “is-grounded” stereotyping. I would like to draw attention to a particular type of “ought-grounded” stereotyping that leads to discrimination. So instead of discrimination that is based on stereotypical properties that group members are perceived as having, discrimination follows from certain stereotypical properties that members ought to have but either do not have or do not display outwardly well enough or to the extent that they “should.”
I take Piper’s claims about both stereotyping and political discrimination to be accurate, but incomplete. Further, in terms of political discrimination, Piper’s account only captures descriptive stereotyping. An irrelevant property of some person that is taken to indicate inferiority implies possession of a disvalued property. And so treatment of some person based on stereotypical properties that one ought to possess by virtue of group membership—where stereotypes associated with that group are valued but that a group member lacks—can never be political discrimination. So as to capture discrimination from both descriptive and normative stereotyping, I understand political discrimination as a manifest attitude in which any property (either perceived to be possessed or perceived ought to be possessed) that is irrelevant to judgments of some person’s intrinsic value or competence informs an action that either benefits or harms that person.

Now political discriminators may take stereotypical properties to—of necessity—exist in and principally define some group, and in this way expect members to possess them. For these discriminators, group members are preferable and worthy of fair treatment to the extent that they perform actions in accordance with stereotypes; possession of the stereotypical properties would confer a kind of value to members. However, members’ failure to be instantiations of the stereotypes frustrates discriminators’ expectations or desires, and ultimately leads to discriminatory behavior. In these cases, neither primary attributes such as race or gender nor stereotypical properties such as unintelligence make members disvaluers, thereby indicating members’ inferiority. And so political discrimination does not derive from descriptive properties. In these cases I understand the role that stereotypes play in discrimination somewhat differently than Piper. These are captured by a kind of ought-grounded stereotyping that I term “discrimination from normative stereotyping.”

Though rather overlooked, and particularly so in philosophical literature, ought-grounded stereotyping has received some attention. Kwame Appiah seems to have coined the phrase “normative stereotyping.” For Appiah, normative stereotyping “is grounded in a social consensus about how they [members of a group] ought to behave in order to conform appropriately to the norms associated with membership in their group.” These stereotypes are necessary scripts for social identities. As both important and necessary scripts, normative stereotypes are neither necessarily inaccurate nor morally problematic.

11 Appiah, “Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity.”
12 Appiah, “Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity,” 48
However, these scripts “have to be configured in such a way as to serve as potential instruments in the construction of a dignified individuality.”\textsuperscript{14} Normative stereotypes become morally problematic when they lead to inferiorizing those who bear them. When this occurs, reshaping them becomes necessary.

Feminist theorists and social psychologists have also discussed \textit{ought}-grounded stereotyping. Feminists have primarily focused on the relationship between \textit{ought}-grounded stereotypes and the oppression of women. These \textit{ought}-grounded stereotypes lead women to and keep them in marriages, sexual relationships, and housewifery roles that they often despise. Further, \textit{ought}-grounded stereotypes related to certain women are thought to have derived from a particular image of women created by men.\textsuperscript{15} This image, thought to derive from the nature of women, caused women with careers to be negatively evaluated by portraying them as denying their natural femininity in a way that made them unhappy or moribund. And in this way \textit{ought}-grounded stereotypes were tied to ethics, where nonconformity made women vicious. Still further, \textit{ought}-grounded stereotypes have been taken to explain psychological barriers to physical tasks and intellectual pursuits, govern the ways women move and groom themselves, and the prevalence of anorexia and bulimia among women.\textsuperscript{16}

Contemporary social psychologists—particularly those working on gender and workplace evaluations—discuss a particular type of \textit{ought}-grounded stereotyping referred to as “prescriptive stereotyping.” Madeline Heilman proposes that these stereotypes “designate how women and men are but also how they should be. They function as injunctive norms, dictating what attributes and behaviors are appropriate and inappropriate for people from different groups—in this case men and women.”\textsuperscript{17} Failure to act in accordance with these stereotypes often leads to negative evaluations for women and men.\textsuperscript{18} Beyond the idea that there are prescriptive stereotypes for women and men, it has been theorized that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[17] Heilman, “Gender Stereotypes and Workplace Bias,” 123.
\item[18] On negative evaluations of women, see Heilman, “Gender Stereotypes and Workplace Bias”; Haddock and Zanna, “Preferring ‘Housewives’ to ‘Feminists’”; Rudman and Fairchild, "Reactions to Counterstereotypic Behavior"; Carbado and Gulati, \textit{Acting White}? On negative evaluations of men, see Rosette, Mueller, and Lebel, “Are Male Leaders Penalized for Seeking Help?”; Moss-Racusin, Phelan, and Rudman, "When Men Break the Gender Rules"; Berdahl, “Harassment Based on Sex.”
\end{footnotes}
conforming to these stereotypes influences job/career choices, education types/commitments, and even spending habits/values.\(^\text{19}\)

I propose a more nuanced account of *ought*-grounded stereotyping than the above subclasses, one where the relationship between stereotyping and discrimination accords to the following form:

1. Members of group \(X\) ought to \(\phi\) or possess property \(P\) if they are legitimate members of group \(X\).
2. Person \(A\) is a member of group \(X\).
3. Therefore, person \(A\) ought to \(\phi\) or possess property \(P\).
4. Discriminator \(D\) observes that person \(A\) either does not \(\phi\) or does not possess property \(P\).
5. Discriminator \(D\) judges that person \(A\) is not a legitimate member of group \(X\), and that they are contemptible because of it.
6. Political discrimination is the result of discriminator \(D\)'s judgment that person \(A\) fails to be a legitimate member of group \(X\) and is contemptible because of it.

In 1, “legitimate members of group \(X\)” means any particular’s possession of all those properties deemed proper to it, and possession of them in a way that satisfies expectations or desires of some agent making judgments about the particular. If I purchase a watch, then I expect or desire it to perform certain tasks in certain ways given attributes that it ought to possess. My judgment that the watch fails in this way both disappoints and frustrates me. I then judge the watch to be illegitimate and of lesser, little, or no value depending on the distance between my expectations or desires and its performance.

In the above schema, however, we are discussing the legitimacy of persons. And so 5 adds a step to this more ordinary sense of judgment at some particular’s illegitimacy. Failure to possess stereotypical properties in a way that satisfies “judges” licenses contempt, “which is directed toward a person that the contemnor sees as failing to meet an important standard.”\(^\text{20}\) In the above, con-

\(^{19}\) Akerlof and Kranton, “Economics and Identity” and *Identity Economics*; Fordham and Ogbu, “Black Students’ School Success”; Ogbu, *Black American Students in an Affluent Suburb*. I question how much of the prescriptive stereotypes regarding women and men actually apply to their respective sets, particularly as it relates to Black women and men. Reading works by authors such as Sojourner Truth (*Narrative of Sojourner Truth*) and Patricia Hill Collins (*Black Feminist Thought*) regarding Black women, and W.E.B. Du Bois (*The Philadelphia Negro*) and Malcolm X (“Not Just an American Problem, but a World Problem”) regarding Black men is enough to raise questions about whether many of these studies capture correct prescriptive stereotypes that apply to all women and men.

\(^{20}\) Bell, *Hard Feelings*, 33. Bell acknowledges that contempt for nonpersons is possible and may
tempt is the result of a particular kind of disappointment in and frustration with a person’s failure to meet the standard of legitimacy by possession of normative stereotypes. Unlike an emotion such as resentment that is directed at targets for a wrong action, contempt is directed at targets for a state of being. Some person is contemptible because they fail to “be” as they should, given the group to which they belong. The discriminator views the target as a failure, and as a result sees themself as superior to the target.

Finally, because we are discussing stereotyping persons in a way that leads to political discrimination, adds a step to both the more ordinary judgments of some particular’s illegitimacy and the contempt directed at some person’s being a failure. For the discriminator, a feeling of superiority gives them a right to exercise (unjust) power over the inferior target in a way that harms the target. So, discriminator judges that person is not a legitimate member of group ; the person fails to possess all those attributes deemed proper to them in a way that satisfies discriminator D’s expectations or desires. Person A’s illegitimacy both disappoints and frustrates discriminator D. The disappointment and frustration motivates discriminator D’s judgment that person A is a failure. Discriminator D judges that person A is contemptible due to being a failure, and sees themself as superior to person A. Discriminator D perceives that this feeling of superiority gives them a right to exercise power over person A in a way that harms person A. The exercising of power over person A in a way that harms is informed by a property that is irrelevant to judgments of person A’s intrinsic value or competence; it is political discrimination.

My view of normative stereotyping is different from Appiah’s, feminists’, and social psychologists’ contributions in important respects. First, I do not take a social consensus to be necessary for grounding normative stereotypes. Though they often take cues from society, and though many are widely held, normative stereotypes need not be connected to widely held or agreed-upon social identities. They can be constructed and reconstructed by individuals in ways that reflect individuals’ unique psychological dispositions. An individual or group can construct stereotypes where “white,” “blonde,” “tall,” “southern,” “men” are legitimate members only if they are “conservative,” “heterosexual,” “gun-rights advocates,” discriminating against those who possess the former attributes but

challenge her account, though it can be captured by modifications. She concedes this given our everyday usage of contempt for nonpersons. I am not convinced that our everyday usage presents such a challenge. We may speak as though we condemn objects; however, I take some agent’s superiority to what pretends to be an equal to be a significant motivator for contempt (see Roberts, Emotions, 256). However, “pretending” requires intentionality and deception, both of which are lacking in nonpersons.

Bell, Hard Feelings, 39.
who fail to possess the latter. This proposal explains shifting and seemingly inconsistent stereotypes that change in accordance with region, location, and circumstance. This proposal can also explain subgroup stereotypes (for example Black women or Black women of a certain skin or body type). Thus it can explain particular cases of intra-racial and intra-gender discrimination that are rather difficult to capture.

Second, much of the literature from feminists and social psychologists takes ought-grounded stereotypes to derive from nature. I want to be clear that discriminators need not take normative stereotypes to be natural. Though normative stereotyping takes some group to “be like X,” which motivates the thought that legitimate group members ought to “X,” “X” need not be thought to be natural to the group.

Third, much of the discriminatory behavior in the literature above seems to derive in part from descriptive stereotyping. In much of the literature on women and workplace discrimination, women who violate prescriptive stereotypes for the purpose of succeeding in what is considered “men’s work” are negatively evaluated and suffer penalties. However, disvalue seems to be placed on the stereotypes prescribed for women because of disvalue placed on women’s descriptive properties. Here, women are thought to have descriptive properties distinct from and inferior to men’s. Prescriptive stereotypes are then imposed on women such that they are viewed negatively when they do not conform to them. However, conforming to these stereotypes would not confer value to women. And so women are negatively evaluated whether they do or do not conform to stereotypes. Men, on the other hand, should not conform to stereotypes prescribed for women because men should not “act like inferior beings,” and conforming to these stereotypes is tantamount to “acting like inferior beings.” Take the action of running. Men ought not “run like a girl,” because “running like a girl” is thought to be “running badly,” and men ought not “be or act as inferior.”

The stereotypical image need not be “deep” or involve “serious” properties. It can be as simple as being “able to sing” or being “knowledgeable about a certain kind of art or sports history.”

Consider Immanuel Kant’s early view of women. Kant tells us that: “Laborious learning or painful grubbing, even if a woman could get very far with them, destroy the merits that are proper to her sex” (“Observation on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime,” 41). Men and women (by nature) have different virtues. Women ought to attempt to flourish only by conforming to women’s virtues. However, rather than esteem women’s virtues and women who conform to them, Kant later disparages women’s virtues (even though he claims that women and men have equivalent understandings—albeit oriented toward different qualities). Here: (1) men and women have different virtues; (2) women should act in accordance with their virtues; and (3) women’s virtues are of significantly less worth than men’s.

At the heart of “running like a girl,” I take there to be disparagement attributed to “being a girl.”
though “running like a girl” is indicative of “inferiority,” women ought to “run like a girl.” Women are negatively evaluated when they do not conform to this stereotype—particularly when they best men. However, when they do conform they are still disparaged. Why? It is indicative of “inferiority.” This seems to typify much of what is captured by “prescriptive stereotyping.” Here, discriminatory action derives in part from descriptive stereotyping because the prescriptions are grounded in disvalued descriptive properties imposed on women. Prescriptive stereotyping tends to derogate the (descriptive) content of the prescription. In this way, prescriptive stereotyping shares a property with both “is-grounded” and “ought-grounded” stereotyping. I want to be clear that in my account there is no disvalue—but rather genuine value—placed on normative stereotypes.

An example of normative stereotyping. Early during my two years at Union Theological Seminary I had ambitions of working on problems of theodicy and proofs for the existence of God that followed from an appreciation of and perhaps a bit of a fascination with the works of Leibniz, St. Anselm, and Descartes. I recall speaking with several of my then colleagues about my ambitions at a gathering during my first week at the seminary, as we were all sharing our academic interests. And I recall the response from two of my Black-male colleagues in attendance: “Who is this going to help?” The implicature was that this was not a worthwhile project for me. From the statement it was clear that because I was African American and an aspiring theologian I should have the academic aim or ambition of “helping others,” by which they meant solving a particular set of social or political problems (perhaps by proposing very specific solutions)—a fact that was later confirmed in conversation with them. However, while discussing our academic interests, this sort of criticism was not leveled against any white seminarian. My ambitions, I am sure, affected their perception of me as a potentially legitimate African American theologian. I have no doubt that—given the fervor with which this statement was uttered and confirmed—these men would have revoked my admission recommendation if they could.

Perhaps with the exception of withholding friendship, these potential political discriminators did not discriminate against me.25 However, let us assume

---

25 It is interesting that statements like “You X like a girl/woman” are never uttered positively, even when it relates to what is considered “women’s work.” No one says “You cook like a woman” or “You sew like a woman.” Why? That would add value—in fact value greater than men’s—to what is characteristically “woman,” which undermines the disparagement attributed to womanhood.

Following Piper, I take the withholding of friendship under certain conditions to be both an immoral and politically discriminatory harm (“Higher-Order Discrimination”). And so I take political discrimination to regard at least two classes. First, there is political discrimination that is both illegal and immoral. Second, there is political discrimination that, while legal (and perhaps ought to be in a liberal democracy), is nonetheless immoral.
that they had certain power to affect admittance and hiring decisions, which I assume if they currently have certain positions in the academy. Let us also assume that this response to me is not so extraordinarily rare that it has only occurred in my experiences. I do not see how this political discrimination can be captured with discrimination from descriptive stereotyping. The primary attribute of being African American was not seen as a source of inferiority. These men did not commit to anything like the view that African Americans are not smart enough to work on theodicy or proofs. Further, I was not somehow inferior because theodicy or proofs of God’s existence were deemed illegitimate work for theologians. The source of my inferiority was my academic interests, paired with my ethnic group, given certain expectations about how I ought to “be” as a member of the group. My actual academic interests, whatever they may have been, failed to satisfy their expectations and led them to feel disappointment and frustration. As a result, both colleagues felt contempt, which produced a feeling of moral superiority. And political discrimination would follow from this feeling. So rather than following discrimination from descriptive stereotyping, a better way to capture the potential discriminatory behavior of these men, and the actual political discrimination of persons like them, is as follows:

1. African American theologians ought to be concerned with social justice in their academic pursuits, if they are in fact legitimate African American theologians.
2. Corey Barnes is an African American theologian.
3. Therefore, Corey Barnes ought to be concerned with social justice in his academic pursuits.
4. (However) discriminators D and F both observe that Corey Barnes is not concerned with social justice in his academic pursuits (at least not to the extent that he should be, as evidenced by his particular statements).
5. Discriminators D and F judge that Corey Barnes is not a legitimate African American theologian, and that he is contemptible because of it.
6. Political discrimination is (or would have been if power was so accorded) the result of discriminators D’s and F’s judgment that Corey Barnes fails to be concerned with social justice in his academic pursuits (and thus fails to be a legitimate African American theologian), and that he is contemptible because of it.

Now failure to meet political discriminators’ expectations of what African American theologians ought to be might license political discriminators to evaluate African American theologians’ work of a lesser quality or value to theology and discriminate against them in hiring practices. Or, discriminators may consider
these theologians less worthy of friendship, collegiality, or a certain type of treatment as a colleague. In each case, a property that is irrelevant to judgments of the African American theologian’s intrinsic value or competence would inform an action that harms them.

Perhaps contrary to intuitions, discrimination from normative stereotyping captures discrimination against individuals who are referenced by certain slurs. I take these to be examples of first-order political discrimination from normative stereotyping. Consider the term “race traitor” and the family of slurs that fall under it. The Racial Slurs Database defines “race traitor” as “a term used by whites for a white who marries a nonwhite.” The “race traitor,” as defined in this way, has an attraction to the wrong kind of person; they fail to perform some action that they ought to perform—namely, marrying a white person. Someone who targets individuals with this term thinks that whites ought only to be attracted to and marry other whites if they are legitimate white persons. The term picks out a failure of this behavior to be manifest, and further signals some greater failure to “be” as the person should. Use of “traitor” seems to signal an emotion stronger than contempt—namely, (misguided) moral hatred. The “race traitor” is taken to be a moral offense who must be overcome. And so use of “traitor” signals that discriminatory behavior against the target is not merely justified but morally required. One might think of Michal Szewczuk’s statement that Prince Harry is a “race traitor,” and that he should be assassinated for marrying Meghan Markle. So:

1. Whites ought to be sexually attracted to and marry only whites, if they are in fact legitimate white persons.
2. Prince Harry is a white person.
3. Therefore, Prince Harry ought to be sexually attracted to and marry only a white.
4. Michal Szewczuk observed that Prince Harry is not sexually attracted to and has not married only a white.
5. Michal Szewczuk judged that Prince Harry is not a legitimate white person, but rather a “race traitor,” and hates him because of it.
6. Political discrimination (in the form of assassination) was then recommended after Michal Szewczuk’s judgment that Prince Harry fails to be sexually attracted to and marry only a white.

27 See Hampton, who distinguishes four kinds of hatred—namely, simple, malicious, spiteful, and moral (“Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred”).
28 Melendez, “British Neo-Nazi Who Threatened ‘Race Traitor’ Prince Harry Sentenced to Four Years in Prison.”
“Race traitor” as defined above is inadequate. There are terms used to indicate Black (and other racial and ethnic group) “race traitors.” A better understanding of “race traitor” is a slur word used to target any person who is perceived as having attitudes/beliefs or supporting positions that are thought to oppose the supposed attitudes/beliefs, positions, interests, advantages, or well-being of that person’s own race or ethnic group. For those who use the term, very specific attitudes/beliefs, positions, interests, etc., are attributed to certain groups. These are properties that are supposed to define members of specific groups by virtue of their belonging to those groups. These properties are stereotypically imposed insofar as persons tend to be more complex than the properties imposed on them allow. Therefore, in some sense, these are falsely taken to be exclusive, definitive, and paradigmatic properties of groups; in a word, they are stereotypes. However, the “race traitor” would not be hated if they possessed properties that are imposed on their group. “Race traitors” are hated because they ought to possess stereotypical properties but fail to possess them. “Race traitors” are hated because they have committed a sort of racial/ethnic treason by failing to possess these properties—by failing to be legitimate members of their race or ethnic group.

“Uncle Tom”/“Aunt Jane” and the more contemporary “sellout” are “Black race traitors” who are perceived as betraying their group in some way, most often as it relates to the supposed attitudes/beliefs, positions, interests, advantages, or well-being of whites. The “Uncle Tom” and “Aunt Jane” might be perceived as being ashamed of having Black ancestry—particularly if they do not wear their hair or clothes in particular ways or if their sexual partners are not Black.29 Or, they may fail to appreciate “Black culture” or honor certain historical or contemporary Black figures. “Uncle Tom” and “Aunt Jane” are especially caricatures for Black persons (most often African Americans) who are perceived as being servile to whites or other racial/ethnic groups—particularly to the detriment of themselves and other Blacks. A “Tom” or “Jane” might also fail to support policies that are thought to benefit Blacks, or may endorse policies that are thought to harm Blacks. So, one might be perceived as an “Uncle Tom” or “Aunt Jane” if one is not a progressive liberal or is critical of policies such as affirmative action, or one does not have beliefs proper to Blacks.30 In certain circles, one can be called an “Uncle Tom” or “Aunt Jane” if they favor integration or assimilationism and disfavor sep-

29 The latter seems implicit in Mills’s descriptions of the “Racial Solidarity” and “Questionable Motivations” arguments that people use to explain why Black men have a moral duty to marry Black women (“Do Black Men Have a Moral Duty to Marry Black Women?”).

30 Although Christie seems unclear about the distinction between the terms “acting white” and “Uncle Tom,” he gives an account of an encounter between himself and Maxine Waters, who he claims called him an “Uncle Tom” because: “White people work for Republicans? Not African Americans!” (Acting White). Here, the “Uncle Tom” is one who is not liberal.
The terms might be imposed on persons who are employed with certain employers—say the police or FBI—that are seen as contributing to the oppression of Blacks. Still further, an “Uncle Tom” or “Aunt Jane” may refuse to take sides with members of the “Black race” over members of other races in circumstances wherein “allegiance to the race” is deemed to be required. The response to all of these is: “This ‘Uncle Tom’ or ‘Aunt Jane’ isn’t down for ‘us.’” Whatever specific content motivates use of the term, “Uncle Toms” or “Aunt Janes” fail to possess appropriate properties (attitudes, interests, etc.), or fail to possess them in the right way or to the appropriate extent, given the perception of persons who target them with the terms. “Uncle Toms” and “Aunt Janes” fail to demonstrate the appropriate concern for the “Black race.” They are perceived as illegitimate and are hated for being moral failures or offenses who must be overcome. Discrimination against them becomes morally required.

The “white nigger” and “nigger lover” are “white race traitors.” Persons targeted with the terms are perceived as betraying the attitudes/beliefs, positions, interests, etc., of whites, particularly in favor of those of Blacks. Historically, the former was a term popularized by white southerners to refer to other white persons who sided with Blacks or “Black interests” during the civil rights era, while the latter was used throughout history to characterize whites who would either involve themselves in consensual friendships/relationships with Blacks, adopt Black children, or express admiration for Black figures. Both would be applied to white persons who failed to side with whites in certain instances wherein “allegiance to the race” is deemed to be required. And currently, these terms are used to characterize white people who are critical of “whiteness” as a political ideology (those in “whiteness studies,” for example) or who are critical of “whiteness” being taken as the norm (for example, in fashion or with regard to beauty). The response is something like: “These ‘white niggers’ don’t love themselves.” And as has already been shown by appeal to Szewczuk, what makes the “white nigger” and “nigger lover” a target of hate is a perception of their failure to have the appropriate concern for white people.

Perhaps contrary to intuitions given the history of the terms, I think that one can substitute the “interests of Blacks” that allow the specific use of “nigger” for

(I doubt that Waters’s statement would be different if Christie was a libertarian or constitutional party member.)

31 “Black Nationalism, also known as black separatism, is a complex set of beliefs emphasizing the need for the cultural, political, and economic separation of African Americans from white society” (Appiah and Gates, Africana, 80).

32 For a genealogy of typical traits of and politics behind “sellout,” see Kennedy, Sellout.

33 I understand this term in contrast to those like J. L. A. Garcia, who seem to read race-traitor terms such as “nigger lover” as descriptive stereotypes (“The Heart of Racism”).
“interests of X,” without changes to the individual being perceived as a “white race traitor,” and thus as one who has committed a sort of racial treason. “Nigger lover,” would become “derogatory-term-for-nonwhite-group-X lover,” (“spic lover,” for instance), and the individual targeted by the term would be hated in exactly the same way as the “nigger lover.” Like the “Uncle Tom,” whatever specific content licenses use of the term, targeted white persons fail to possess appropriate properties, or fail to possess them in the right way or to the appropriate extent, given the perception of persons who use the terms.\textsuperscript{34}

It may appear that descriptive stereotyping captures the use of these slurs. I deny this. Obviously, certain properties describe targeted individuals—servility to race X, attraction to and friendships with members of race Y, etc. Certainly there must be some historical properties (content) for these terms. Some particular—some individual or term—must be perceived or thought of as possessing properties (content) in order for it to make sense. However, as it relates to these terms, the disvalue that connects stereotypes to discrimination does not follow from specific properties per se. Discrimination derives from the perception that certain groups should possess certain properties and that they are valuable to the extent that they possess them. People targeted by these terms fail to possess these. So the “white nigger” in the South during the civil rights era is killed alongside the “nigger,” but not because of the properties that they are perceived as having—an affinity for Black humanity and a perception that Blacks are equal to whites. Rather, it is the properties that they lack—the vision of white supremacy, a heightened concern or love for white people over all other groups, and certain psychological, economic, or social interests relating to whites—that make them the target of the term, and therefore make their death morally required. The “white nigger” could just as easily be the “white chink” or the “white kike,” and the reaction will be the same: “So-and-so is a ‘race traitor,’ and deserves to be

\textsuperscript{34} The white race traitor is a bit trickier than the Black race traitor with respect to normative versus descriptive stereotyping. This is so because it is more easily grounded in a hatred or disdain of other races than the Black race traitor. Those who use white race-traitor terms more often take other racial/ethnic groups to be subhuman or less. For example, when a Black political discriminator uses the term “Uncle Tom,” it is less likely that they perceive whites as subhuman or less human than Blacks. Thus, when some Black person is an “Uncle Tom” or “Aunt Jane” for a political discriminator, it is less clear that what makes the Black person contemptible are the actual properties that they have. Now, Szewczuk may think that Prince Harry—being a white person—has some duty to continue the “pure” white race by marrying a white woman. As a result, Szewczuk may not think that marrying a nonwhite person is contemptible \textit{simpliciter}. However, being a neo-Nazi, Szewczuk probably thinks that Black people just are contemptible, and that attraction to them is a property that makes white people deserving of contempt. The latter is less often the case when Black, Jewish, or Asian political discriminators use race-traitor terms.
assassinated.” Currently, I would imagine that, to many supporters of what is now called “white nationalism,” white persons who either do not support it or deplore it as yet another kind of white supremacy are white race traitors. Why? They fail to support a certain vision that they ought to support by virtue of being white.

Further, it is commonly thought that the use of “Uncle Tom” indicates an awareness that the target has either an overvalued conception of whiteness or a belief that whites are superior to Blacks. However, there have been “race men” who struggled for Black equality, engaged in cultural practices typically understood to be Black, supported certain policies perceived as beneficial to Black people, etc., but who were disparaged and delegitimated by the term, and thereby discriminated against for merely engaging in relationships with women who were not Black.\(^{35}\) There need be no perception that targets believed that whites generally, or white and non-Black women specifically, are superior to Blacks. Failing to engage in a relationship with women whom they ought motivated use of the term. These men committed a kind of racial treason by merely loving members of non-Black racial groups. Additionally, it seems flatly inaccurate to think that every Black conservative, every person who is employed as a police officer, or every Black person who opposes policies like affirmative action, and who have been the target of the term, overvalue a conception of whiteness or believe that white people are superior to Black people. They merely supported policies or positions, or held jobs, that were perceived as “not Black.” Now these terms all have a very particular history, and thus are more often used in certain situations. However, the point of using them seems to be the same—namely, to pick out individuals who are illegitimate members of some race or ethnic group because they fail to satisfy some stereotypical image of the race or ethnic group.

The above slurs (“Uncle Tom” and “nigger lover”) are different from ones like “nigger,” “kike,” and “chink” in at least two ways. First, they tend to be imposed by in-group members, while the latter tend to be imposed by members of out-groups. Second, the latter—however they are defined—seem to impose descriptive, disvalued, stereotypical properties on their targets.\(^{36}\) The “nigger” is “lazy,” “ignorant,” etc. The “kike” is “avaricious,” “deceitful,” etc. The “chink” is “untrustworthy,” “shifty,” etc. Discrimination from these follows descriptive stereotyping. “Race-traitor” terms—however they are defined—attempt to impose certain descriptive stereotypical properties on targets by imposition on groups to which targets belong. However, hatred directed at targets derives from their failure to possess these properties. Discrimination from these follows normative stereo-

---

35 See Kennedy, Sellout, 64n.
36 For discussion of work on the relationship between slurs and stereotypes, see Jeshion, “Slurs and Stereotypes.”
typing. What all of these slurs have in common is that they either recommend or require political discrimination merely by use.\textsuperscript{37}

When political discriminators use race-traitor terms such as “Uncle Tom” or “nigger lover,” they perform three acts. First, discriminators signal that some target is an illegitimate individual of some group. They have failed to possess all those properties deemed proper to them, and in a way that satisfy expectations of some agent making judgments about them.

Second, rather than merely signaling that race traitors are contemptible, discriminators direct an attitude of moral hatred at the target for being illegitimate. The standard that the target fails to meet is a serious moral standard for which mere contempt cannot account. Following Jean Hampton, I understand moral hatred as “an aversion to someone who has identified himself [or herself] with an immoral cause or practice, prompted by moral indignation and accompanied by the wish to triumph over him [or her] and his [or her] cause or practice in the name of some fundamental moral principle or objective, mostly notably justice.”\textsuperscript{38} Users are committed to the view that the race traitor is a treacherous being who has committed to some perverse cause over which the discriminator—being morally superior—has an obligation to triumph.

Finally, because the target is a treacherous being who must be triumphed over, discriminators are signaling to others that poor treatment against the target is more than merely justified, but required. The requirement of poor treatment is often more austere than political discrimination that is considered justified in more common cases of normative stereotyping. Michal Szewczuk recommended assassination for Prince Harry’s racial treachery. Martin Delany was shot at after having been branded a race traitor.\textsuperscript{39} Fannie Lou Hamer, when forcefully declaring that Uncle Toms must be stopped, exclaimed: “I don’t believe in killing, but a good whipping behind the bushes wouldn’t hurt them.”\textsuperscript{40} So, the political discriminator—in using race-traitor terms—expresses something like: “Because you fail to possess certain properties given the group to which you belong, you are illegitimate. More than just being a failure, you are a moral offense. I hate you! And because you must be triumphed over, I demand you be treated poorly (or significantly worse than legitimate members).”

It is obvious that discrimination from normative stereotyping need not in-

\textsuperscript{37} Hom has proposed that slurs possess thick, negative, truth-conditional content (“A Puzzle about Pejoratives”). And so, slurs prescribe behavior based on an evaluation from a fact. This account is referred to as normative descriptivism (Cappelen and Dever, \textit{Bad Language}, 93).

\textsuperscript{38} Hampton, “Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred,” 61.

\textsuperscript{39} Kennedy, \textit{Sellout}, 38.

\textsuperscript{40} Kennedy, \textit{Sellout}, 49.
clude a term that captures the political discriminator’s hatred for illegitimate targets. Further, a political discriminator need not use “rate traitor” or race-traitor terms to direct moral hatred at some target. In the preceding, the discussion merely regarded those who commit to the use of these terms.

I understand cases wherein race-traitor terms are used as specific cases of first-order political discrimination from normative stereotyping. These discriminators, in using these terms and thus recommending the aforementioned acts, have an unashamed commitment to particular stereotypical images of groups. They use these terms to target persons for whom they have moral hatred. Still, there are cases of higher-order political discrimination from normative stereotyping.

Recall that, for Piper, higher-order political discrimination is “the attitude within which a primary disvalued or valued property in turn confers disvalue or value respectively on further properties of the disvaluee or valuee respectively.” With normative stereotyping, certain things that a person—call her or him the disvaluee—either does or fails to do are judged through the light of a failure to possess all those attributes deemed proper to a discriminator’s stereotypical image of how group members ought to be. So, let us say that a person has a stereotypical image of female academics such that a woman is a legitimate female academic to the extent that she works in feminism. A woman who works on figures such as Hegel or Kant, but who does not work in feminism, might have her work on Hegel or Kant negatively evaluated in light of her failure to produce feminist scholarship. The discriminator judges that this academic fails to meet an important standard—namely, the standard of legitimacy as a female academic. The discriminator, being disappointed by and frustrated with the academic’s failure, judges that the academic is contemptible. This judgment produces a feeling of superiority in the discriminator that justifies the exercise of (unjust) power over the “inferior” target in a way that harms her.

Recall also that a marked distinction between the first-order and higher-order political discriminator is that the latter rejects the imposition of stereotypes, and would reject that they impose the stereotypes on others. A part of these discriminators’ self-concept is tied to being this kind of person. And so, higher-order political discriminators deceive themselves in some way so as to be blind to both their stereotyping and the discrimination deriving from it. The higher-order political discriminator who judges the academic’s work in accordance with her failure to be a legitimate female academic denies or suppresses their normative stereotyping by attributing disvalue to higher-order properties—the academic’s failure as a Hegelian or Kantian. The contempt is taken to be licensed by a failure to produce good Hegelian or Kantian scholarship, and not a failure to be a legitimate female academic. This deception preserves the discriminator’s self-concept.
A discriminator’s appeal to the stereotypical image of the “female academic” may cause them to evaluate a woman’s non-feminist academic work in light of her failing (or succeeding) to satisfy the stereotypical image. A non-feminist academic is deemed a bad Hegelian or Kantian because she fails to produce feminist work. She may be so deemed even if her work on Hegel or Kant should/could be unrelated to work on feminism. And this may lead to an unwillingness to hire or promote the academic, or failure to review her work on Hegel or Kant fairly.

Now normative stereotyping and the political discrimination that follows from it are both less recognizable and much more tolerated when recognized than descriptive stereotyping and the political discrimination that follows from it. Normative stereotyping is less recognizable because it receives far less attention than descriptive stereotyping. We have become more sensitive to acts of racism, sexism, etc. And these acts—when linked to beliefs—are connected to stereotypical traits that group members are thought to possess on the basis of belonging to groups. When people are treated in ways that harm them because they are thought to possess stereotypical disvalued group traits, we recognize the treatment as both discriminatory and immoral. We recognize the treatment in this way because it derives from racist or sexist beliefs, and we take these beliefs to be more than simply epistemically wrong, but immoral. This is not the case with normative stereotyping, which does not impose stereotypical disvalued group traits on members. Thus, it is not connected to racism, sexism, etc. When people are treated in ways that harm them on the basis of failing to possess proper traits—that is, traits that they ought to possess—we often fail to categorize the treatment as discriminatory because it is not easily connected to racist or sexist beliefs. There is much more difficulty naming this treatment as discriminatory and tracing it to a harmful kind of stereotyping.

Normative stereotyping and the political discrimination that follows from it are also much more tolerated or respectable even when recognized. This is for four reasons. First, when we recognize the imposition of normative stereotypes, we less often think that it will motivate discriminatory practices against those who fail to possess the stereotypes. We tend to take this the imposition to be “kooky,” “odd,” “old-timey,” or “folksy” behavior that is unserious. Second, when normative stereotyping is recognized, it tends not to be recognized as unjust in the way that descriptive stereotyping is. In a sense, because the stereotyping is not commonly recognized as unjust, actions that follow from it are not taken to be discriminatory. And so, for these two reasons, normative stereotyping tends

Further, one’s being a good Hegelian or Kantian might depend on producing work in feminism that is in vogue. One may have to be the “right kind of feminist” in order to have other attributes legitimated.
not to be accorded the kind of seriousness that it should be accorded. Third, even when we recognize the stereotype as normative and that certain treatments follow from it, we are less likely to acknowledge the treatment as immoral. There tends to be buy-in for certain race-traitor terms and ideas surrounding them—particularly those that derive from groups that have been the targets of out-group hate. Use of the terms and promulgation of the ideas surrounding them legitimate treatment in a way that makes the target—and not the discriminator—responsible for the treatment. Fourth, with out-group normative stereotyping, there is often an endorsement of some stereotypical image by the discriminator who does not fit the stereotype themself. As a result of the discriminator’s acceptance of and preference for a stereotypical image, there is often an unwillingness to call the discriminator racist, sexist, etc. For non-Black persons who prefer some stereotypical image of, say Black women, it might appear to others that they are “culturally pluralist.” Persons who make statements such as: “I need to channel my inner Black woman!” are very often taken to “embrace difference.” This shields them in a particular way. And so vocalizing contempt for and acting in a discriminatory way toward non-stereotypical targets are less objectionable to people around them. It can be voiced in public without as much interrogation and criticism, so long as the stereotypical image is in vogue.

Consider the following statements:

1. White man says: “You know those damned Black women are committed to ‘telling it like it is’—as they call it. Pitiful. So you know what you’d get from C” (who is Black).

Here, the speaker promotes “telling it like it is” (speaking an uncomfortable truth in a blunt, unvarnished, and perhaps indelicate way) as a disvalued descriptive stereotype. It will be recognized as such, and will most likely be connected to sexist and racist beliefs about Black women. Any act that harms C on the basis of a perception that she possesses this trait will immediately be recognized as discriminatory and immoral, and will neither be tolerated nor respected because of its connection to sexism and racism. Note the difference between 1 and the following:

2. White woman/Black man says: “You know Black women tell it like it is. They give it to you straight, and that’s a good thing. But C [who is Black] doesn’t. I don’t know what’s wrong with her.”

3. Black woman says: “You know we Black women tell it like it is. C doesn’t

---

42 This kind of expectation that masks as “embracing difference” explains Als’s statement: “The sad fact is that in order to cross over, most black actors of [Anthony] Mackie’s generation must ‘act black’ before they’re allowed to act human” (“Underhanded”).
though. You know she’s not really one of us” (she’s not “Black woman” enough).

Though these promote a (normative) stereotype, they may fail to be recognized as such. And even when recognized as promoting a stereotype, they will often fail to be granted the kind of seriousness that would motivate discrimination because they will not be connected with sexism and racism. The statement may be construed as the “odd” behavior of an overly “down” (committed) but good-hearted liberal white woman, or the “folksy” beliefs/“talk” of Blacks. Statement 2 presents dialogue that endorses the stereotyped image by a discriminator who does not fit the stereotype themself. The endorsement of the stereotype lessens the likelihood that the discriminator can be named in a particular way that presents the treatment as problematic. With 3, acts that harm Con the basis her failure to possess this valued attribute may fail to be recognized as immoral. If there is group buy-in for “telling it like it is,” and particularly if it is raised to the level of a group virtue, C—not the discriminator(s)—will be thought to bear the responsibility for any harmful treatment. And so when treatment is recognized as deriving from imposed stereotypes, it may be tolerated or even respected.

3. “BLACK AND BLUE”—CONCLUSION

I would like to close with a few remarks on the moral considerations of normative stereotyping and the discrimination that follows from it. For Piper: “Instances of first-order discrimination are familiar targets of moral condemnation because they disvalue individuals for having attributes perceived as primary disvalued attributes that are not in actuality sources of disvalue.”43 Individuals’ race, sexuality, gender, class, etc., are attributes possessed by individuals that confer disvalue to them. In actuality, however, these properties are not signals of inferiority. This makes both the descriptive stereotyping and the discrimination that follows unwarranted and morally condemnable. In short, discrimination from descriptive stereotyping violates basic notions of fairness. One is judged to lack competence or ability in some way unrelated to a job, skill, responsibility, etc., that is under discussion, and this is unfair.

In addition to a notion of fairness, I take normative stereotyping and the discrimination that follows from it to promote an unjust restriction on autonomy. There is value to individuals (particularly with different emotional dispositions, tastes, and perspectives) cultivating themselves in ways that are expressive of certain properties that they choose. Individuals’ own choices regarding mating, aca-

ademic pursuits, music or culture, political leanings, etc., are important to an individual’s flourishing. These choices (*ceteris paribus*) ought to be respected because individuals’ ability to fashion their own lives in a way that captures their conception of what it means to flourish ought to be respected. Judging persons to be legitimate only insofar as they satisfy some stereotypical image of a group that political discriminators have either set up or to which they appeal, and then discriminating against individuals who do not satisfy the image, unjustly restricts autonomy.

Now, a more complete work is necessary to provide justification for this account. And further, one might think that there are justificatory reasons to defend the use of and ideas behind race-traitor terms such as “Uncle Tom”/“Aunt Jane” or “sellout”—even if there are no such reasons to defend other race-traitor terms (“nigger lover” and “white nigger”). There may be moral asymmetries that give members of certain groups obligations to be legitimate members of some group. One may take appeals to legitimate group members and race-traitor terms to be necessary for liberation, justice, group survival, honor, or self-respect. Still further, one might take there to be good reasons to support group virtues like “telling it like it is,” such that group members who do not possess these group virtues are vicious. One might ground these virtues in historical contexts whereby the group virtue has become necessary. So, say that “telling it like is” derives from and is integrally connected to “speaking truth to power.” And say that “speaking truth to power” has become a necessary virtue for an oppressed people seeking liberation. One might think that there is good reason to believe that members of the oppressed group are virtuous to the extent that they possess the trait, and vicious—deserving contempt or moral hatred—to the extent that they do not. Though I cannot treat these cases here, I ultimately think that these are problematic because they are not weighty enough to override individual autonomy. Agents’ ability to fashion their own lives ought to be respected, which is to say that individuals ought to be able to define themselves. Normative stereotyping and the discrimination that follows from it harm those who do not fit the discriminator’s definitions.

*University of San Diego*

coreybarnes@sandiego.edu

---

44 In a forthcoming work I seek to treat moral considerations of normative stereotyping and discrimination that derives from it. In so doing I cede possible moral asymmetries for different groups that would license normatively stereotyping members of oppressed groups. Therein I philosophically engage a number of arguments that would seek to justify race-traitor terms such as “Uncle Tom”/“Aunt Jane” and “sellout.”
REFERENCES


