Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> USC School of Philosophy en-US Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1559-3061 Well-being, Opportunity, and Selecting for Disability <p>In this paper I look at the much-discussed case of disabled parents seeking to conceive (or “selecting for”) disabled children.&nbsp; I argue that the permissibility of selecting for disability does not depend on the precise impact the disability will have on the child’s wellbeing.&nbsp; I then turn to an alternative analysis, which argues that the permissibility of selecting for disability depends on the impact that disability will have on the child’s future opportunities.&nbsp; Nearly all bioethicists who have approached the issue in this way have argued that disabilities like deafness unacceptably constrain a child’s opportunities.&nbsp; I argue, however, that this conclusion is premature for several reasons.&nbsp; Most importantly, we don’t have a good way of comparing opportunity sets.&nbsp; Thus, we can’t conclude that deaf children will grow up to have a constrained set of opportunities relative to hearing children.&nbsp; I conclude by suggesting that bioethicists and philosophers of disability need to spend more time thinking carefully about the relationship between disability and opportunity.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> Andrew Schroeder Copyright (c) 2018 Andrew Schroeder 2018-10-05 2018-10-05 14 1 10.26556/jesp.v14i1.353 Immigration, Adoption, and the Permissibility of Excluding Newcomers by Birth <p>A recent challenge to statist arguments defending the right of states to exclude prospective immigrants maintains that such statist arguments prove too much.&nbsp; Specifically, the challenge argues that statist arguments, insofar as they are correct, entail that states may permissibily exclude current members' newcomers by birth, which seems to violate a widely held intuition that members' newcomers by birth ought automatically to be granted membership rights.&nbsp; The basic claim is that statist arguments cannot account for the differntial treatment&nbsp;between prospective immigrants and newcomers by birth.&nbsp; Call this the newcomer-by-birth objection.&nbsp; This article rejects the newcomer-by-birth rejection.&nbsp; It begins by sketching the precise extent to which the objection applies to statist arguments.&nbsp; It then examines the case of newcomers by birth and argues for a principled basis for treating them differentially from prospective immigrants such that a right to exclude prospective immigrants need not entail&nbsp;a right to exclude newcomers by birth.&nbsp; But this distinction holds only in most cases, not all, and therefore the newcomer-by-birth objection is not entirely defeated.&nbsp; With respect to the cases in which the objection does hold, it is argued that such cases are morally akin to international adoption, and thus morally benign.&nbsp; All considered, statist arguments easily survive the newcomer-by-birth objection.&nbsp;</p> Thomas Carnes Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Carnes 2018-10-05 2018-10-05 14 1 10.26556/jesp.v14i1.359 Immigrant Selection, Health Requirements, and Disability Discrimination <p>Australia, Canada, and New Zealand currently apply health requirements to prospective immigrants, denying residency to those with health conditions that are likely to impose an “excessive demand” on their publicly funded health and social service programs. In this paper, I investigate the charge that such policies are wrongfully discriminatory against persons with disabilities. I first provide a freedom-based account of the wrongness of discrimination according to which discrimination is wrong when and because it involves disadvantaging people in the exercise of their freedom on the basis of morally arbitrary features of their identity. Discrimination is permissible, I suggest, when it is necessary to advance a valuable exercise of the discriminating agent’s freedom. I then apply this account to the case of social cost health requirements. Against critics of these requirements, I argue that it is sometimes permissible for states to discriminate against prospective immigrants with disabilities. States may do so, I suggest, when such discriminatory treatment is necessary to prevent an increase in rates of mortality and/or morbidity amongst citizens. Alongside critics of social cost health requirements however, I argue that existing policies are likely a form of wrongful discrimination insofar as they are too broad to satisfy this standard.</p> Douglas MacKay Copyright (c) 2018 Douglas MacKay 2018-10-05 2018-10-05 14 1 10.26556/jesp.v14i1.370