Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> USC School of Philosophy en-US Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1559-3061 Parfit, Convergence, and Underdetermination <p>Abstract here.</p> Marius Baumann Copyright (c) 2018 Marius Baumann 2018-03-14 2018-03-14 13 3 10.26556/jesp.v13i3.259 Helping the Rebels <p>In a pair of recent papers, Allen Buchanan has outlined an ambitious account of the ethics of revolution and its implications for military intervention. Buchanan’s account is bold and yet sophisticated. It is bold in that it advances a number of theses that will no doubt strike the reader as highly controversial; it is sophisticated in that it rests on a nuanced account of how revolutions unfold and the constraints that political self-determination places on intervention. He argues that, despite the importance of political self-determination, humanitarian intervention may be permissible without the consent of the rebelling population. Indeed, given certain structural features of revolutions, there are often reasons to disregard the consent of the population oppressed and intervene <em>before</em> the revolution starts. More controversially, he argues that military force may be employed to nullify the democratic constitutional choice of the newly liberated population and impose a particular form of democratic government, if this is necessary to guarantee the conditions for the future exercise of self-determination. In this paper, I further elaborate Buchanan’s account of political self-determination and argue that once correctly understood, it places tighter constraints on intervention than Buchanan allows. Thus, his bold conclusions should be resisted.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> Massimo Renzo Copyright (c) 2018 Massimo Renzo 2018-03-14 2018-03-14 13 3 10.26556/jesp.v13i3.249 On Ex Ante Contractualism <p>Ex ante contractualism holds that in situations involving risk we ought to act in accordance with principles that license the action that satisfies the strongest individual claim, where those claims are a function of the expected value that a given policy gives each person ex ante. I here challenge ex ante contractualism on contractualist grounds. I argue that adopting ex ante contractualism would have far reaching implications that contractualists, or many nonconsequentialist in general, would find very hard to accept. I conclude that to block these implications, contractualists should adopt an ex post approach to deal with decisions under risk.</p> Korbinian Rüger Copyright (c) 2018 Korbinian Rüger 2018-06-07 2018-06-07 13 3 10.26556/jesp.v13i3.323 Is Liberalism Committed to Its Own Demise? <div class="page" title="Page 1"> <div class="layoutArea"> <div class="column"> <p>Are immigration restrictions compatible with liberalism? Recently, Freiman and Hidalgo (2016) have argued that immigration restrictions conflict with the core commitments of liberalism. A society with immigration restrictions in place may well be optimal in some desired respects, but it is not liberal, they argue. So if you care about liberalism more deeply than you care about immigration restrictions, you should give up on restrictionism. You can’t hold on to both. I argue here that many restrictions on contractual, economic, and associational liberties seem to be justified by considerations other than liberty – thus the (undischarged) task for Freiman and Hidalgo is to tell us why such restrictions are justified but immigration restrictions are not. Moreover, even if this worry can be addressed, I argue, liberalism is not committed to its own demise in scenarios where there exist large enough numbers of would-be immigrants who accept and endorse illiberal norms in a way that is sufficiently resistant to change. Such a commitment requires thinking of border coercion as violating an absolute deontological constraint. This, I contend, is implausible.</p> </div> </div> </div> Hrishikesh Suhas Joshi Copyright (c) 2018 Hrishikesh Suhas Joshi 2018-03-14 2018-03-14 13 3 10.26556/jesp.v13i3.367